Introduction

How much can we change the path of aggregate productivity and welfare by policy-induced increase in firms’ innovative investments?

Within a class of canonical models, characterize

- Dynamics of Aggregate Productivity and Output
- Welfare and Fiscal Implications

Two key statistics

1. Impact elasticity
2. Intertemporal knowledge spillovers

Measurement

\[
\text{Impact elasticity} \leq \frac{\text{contribution of entrants’ innovation to growth}}{\text{entrants’ share of innovative investment}}
\]

Wide range of intertemporal knowledge spillovers from literature
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Findings

- Permanent increase in innovation intensity of 1% of output implies
  - Consumption plus physical investment falls for 5-15 years
  - Modest impact on level of aggregate output after 20 years
  - Hard to distinguish from standard business cycle fluctuations

Welfare Implications

- Moderate to large consumption equivalent gains
- Welfare driven by long run response of productivity
- Hard to estimate with 20 years of data

Fiscal Cost equals 1% of output in long run
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- Fiscal Cost equals 1% of output in long run

GHK decompose baseline BGP productivity growth into

- Incumbents’ Innovations on Continuing Products
- Incumbents’ Innovations in Acquiring New Products
- Entrants’ Innovations in Acquiring New Products
- New products to firm: new to society (EV) or “stolen” from other firms (NS)

Measurement: Contribution of entrants’ innovation to growth

See also Akcigit and Kerr 2016
Our model

- We aim to measure elasticities of aggregate productivity growth w.r.t. counterfactual, policy-induced changes in firms' innovative investment.

- Extend GHK to model innovative investment technologies

- Nest workhorse models e.g.
  - Jones (2002)

- Key property: Aggregation of types of innovative investment

\[ \log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = G(x_{ct}, x_{mt}, x_{et}) \]
Pros and Cons of Our Framework

- **Pros:**
  - Nest range of canonical models
  - Tractable transition dynamics and welfare
  - Simple analytical results
  - Clear guide for measurement

- **Cons:**
  - Does not nest models that need state variable for firm types
Pros and Cons of Our Framework

Pros:

- Nest range of canonical models
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Cons:

- Does not nest models that need state variable for firm types
Why not just capitalize intangible investment?

- BEA treats intangible investment same as physical investment
  - Guess at depreciation rate
  - Guess at price deflator for intangible investment
  - Perpetual inventory intangible capital stock
  - Aggregate output CRS in capital stocks and labor

- Our model
  - No obvious intangible capital stock
  - Aggregate increasing returns
  - Spillovers
  - Business stealing
Simple Model

- Only entrants invest
- Two sufficient statistics for long-run, transition dynamics, welfare. Fiscal cost
- Simple bound on impact elasticity

Add investment by incumbent firms

- Two extensions of analytical results
- Conditions for bound on impact elasticity

\[
\text{Impact elasticity} \leq \frac{\text{contribution of entrants’ innovation to growth}}{\text{entrants’ share of innovative investment}}
\]

Measurement

Results
Simple Model

- Two final goods
  - Consumption and Physical Investment (Output)
  - Research Good (Input to Innovation)

- Output produced from differentiated intermediate goods
  - produced with physical capital and production labor

- Research good produced with research labor

- Entrants invest research good to acquire a good
  - create new intermediate goods or
  - improve upon existing goods (business stealing)
Intermediate Goods

$$y_t(z) = \exp(z) k_t(z)^{\alpha} l_{pt}(z)^{1-\alpha}$$

Measure of products $M_t(z)$, $M_t = \sum_z M_t(z)$

Aggregate Output

$$Y_t = \left[ \sum_z y_t(z)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} M_t(z) \right]^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} = C_t + K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta_K) K_t$$

Assuming constant markups $\mu > 1$ and common factor prices

$$Y_t = Z_t K_t^{\alpha} L_{pt}^{1-\alpha} \quad K_t = \sum_z k_t(z) M_t(z) \quad L_{pt} = \sum_z l_{pt}(z) M_t(z)$$

Aggregate productivity

$$Z_t = \left[ \sum_z \exp(z)^{\rho-1} M_t(z) \right]^{1/(\rho-1)}$$
Inputs into Innovative Investment

Research good

\[ Y_{rt} = A_{rt} Z_t^{\phi - 1} L_{rt} \]

Research labor \( L_{rt} = L_t - L_{pt} \). Ratios \( l_{rt} = L_{rt}/L_t \) and \( l_{pt} = L_{pt}/L_t \).

Intertemporal knowledge spillovers \( \phi \leq 1 \)

Research TFP = \( A_{rt} Z_t^{\phi - 1} \)  

Jones (2002) and Bloom et. al. (2017)

Exogenous Scientific Progress \( A_{rt} \) grows at \( \bar{g}_{Ar} \), labor \( L_t \) grows at \( \bar{g}_L \)

\( \phi < 1 \) ideas get “harder to find”

Balanced growth path — \( Y_{rt} \) constant

\[ \bar{g}_Z = \frac{\bar{g}_L + \bar{g}_{Ar}}{1 - \phi} \]
Innovation technologies imply tractable equilibrium aggregation:

\[ \log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = G(x_{et}) \]

subject to

\[ x_{et} = Y_{rt} \]

- Each entrant spends \(1/M_t\) units of the research good at \(t\)
- New products for entrants, \(x_{et}M_t\),
- Fraction \(\delta_e\) stolen, \(1 - \delta_e\) new to society
- Externalities in productivity — \(\mathbb{E} \exp(z')^{\rho-1} = \eta_e \frac{Z_t^{\rho-1}}{M_t} \)

Evolution of aggregate productivity

\[ \log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = \frac{1}{\rho-1} \log [(1 - \delta_{ct}) + \eta_e x_{et}] \]

Product exit \(\delta_{ct} = \delta_0 + \delta_e x_{et}\)
Investments and Aggregate Productivity Growth

Innovation technologies imply tractable equilibrium aggregation:

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Evolution of aggregate productivity

\[ \log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \log \left[ (1 - \delta_{ct}) + \eta_e x_{et} \right] \]

Product exit \(\delta_{ct} = \delta_0 + \delta_e x_{et}\)
Innovation Policy Experiment

Subsidize expenditure on research good $\tau'_{et}$

Raise research intensity of economy

$$i_{rt} = \frac{P_{rt} Y_{rt}}{Y_t}$$

Reallocate labor to research

$$L_{rt} = \frac{i_{rt}}{i_{rt} + \frac{WL_p}{Y}}$$

What are the dynamics of aggregate productivity and output?
\[
\log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = G(Y_{rt})
\]

Impact Elasticity

\[
\log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t - \bar{g}_Z \approx \Theta (\log Y_{rt} - \log \bar{Y}_r)
\]

\[
\Theta \equiv G'(\bar{Y}_r) \bar{Y}_r
\]

From production function for research good

\[
\log Y_{rt} - \log \bar{Y}_r = (\phi - 1) (\log Z_t - \log \bar{Z}_t) + (\log l_{rt} - \log \bar{l}_r)
\]

Two key statistics \( \Theta \) and \( \phi \)
Permanent innovation subsidy and reallocation of labor

$\phi < 1$ implies $Y_{rt}$ constant across BGP’s

$$\log \bar{Z}_t' - \log \bar{Z}_t = \frac{1}{1 - \phi} \left( \log \bar{l}_{rt}' - \log \bar{l}_r \right)$$

$\phi = 1$ change in BGP growth rate

$$\bar{g}'_Z - \bar{g}_Z = \Theta \left( \log \bar{l}_{rt}' - \log \bar{l}_r \right)$$
Aggregate Productivity

\[ \log Z'_{t+1} - \log \bar{Z}_{t+1} = \sum_{k=0}^{t} \Gamma_k (\log l_{rt} - \log \bar{l}_r) \]

\[ \Gamma_0 = \Theta, \quad \Gamma_{k+1} = [1 - \Theta(1 - \phi)] \Gamma_k \]

Aggregate Output

\[ \log Y'_{t} - \log \bar{Y}_{t} = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (\log Z'_{t} - \log \bar{Z}_{t}) + (\log l'_{pt} - \log \bar{l}_p) - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (\log R'_{kt} - \log \bar{R}_k) \]
One-period reallocation of labor towards research
Impact Elasticity
Increase in aggregate productivity above trend
Dynamics: Full Intertemporal Knowledge Spillovers

Permanent increase in aggregate productivity above trend
Limited Intertemporal Knowledge Spillovers

Aggregate productivity reverts back to its initial path
Consumption Equivalent Welfare

\[
\log \xi \approx (1 - \tilde{\beta}) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \tilde{\beta}^t \frac{\bar{Y}}{C} \left[ (\log Z'_t - \log \bar{Z}_t) + (1 - \alpha) \left( \log l'_{pt} - \log \bar{l}_p \right) \right]
\]

\[
\tilde{\beta} = \frac{\exp(g_Y)}{1 + R}
\]

Socially Optimal Research Intensity

\[
i_r^* = \frac{\tilde{\beta} \Theta}{1 - \tilde{\beta} \left[ 1 - (1 - \phi) \Theta \right]}
\]
Fiscal Implications

What subsidy rate is required to change the innovation intensity of the economy

\[ \log \bar{i}_r' - \log \bar{i}_r = \log(1 - \bar{\tau}_e) - \log(1 - \bar{\tau}_e') \]

and what fiscal cost is required?

\[ \frac{\bar{E}'}{\bar{Y}'} - \frac{\bar{E}}{\bar{Y}} = \bar{i}_r' - \bar{i}_r \]
Bounding the Impact Elasticity $\Theta$

$$\Theta = \frac{1}{\rho - 1} \frac{\exp(\bar{g}_z)^{\rho - 1} - \exp(G(0))^{\rho - 1}}{\exp(\bar{g}_z)^{\rho - 1}} \leq \bar{g}_z - G(0)$$

or more generally

$$\Theta \equiv G'(\bar{Y}_r) \bar{Y}_r \leq G(\bar{Y}_r) - G(0) = \bar{g}_z - G(0)$$

Interpreted as

**Impact elasticity** \(\leq\) \(\frac{\text{contribution of entrants' innovation to growth}}{\text{entrants' share of innovative investment}}\) \(=\) \(\frac{\bar{g}_z - G(0)}{1}\)

Firm Dynamics Data

$$\frac{\exp(\bar{g}_z)^{\rho - 1} - \exp(G(0))^{\rho - 1}}{\exp(\bar{g}_z)^{\rho - 1}} \leq \text{employment share of entrants}$$
Talk Outline

- Simple Model
  - Only entrants invest
  - Analytical results for long-run, transition dynamics, welfare, fiscal cost
  - Simple bound on impact elasticity
- Add investment by incumbent firms
  - Two extensions of analytical results
  - Bound on impact elasticity
    \[
    \text{Impact elasticity} \leq \frac{\text{contribution of entrants’ innovation to growth}}{\text{entrants’ share of innovative investment}}
    \]
- Measurement
- Results
Product-level innovation technologies imply tractable equilibrium aggregation:

\[ \log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = G(x_{ct}, x_{mt}, x_{et}) \]

subject to

\[ x_{ct} + x_{mt} + x_{et} = Y_{rt} \]

1. New products by entrants, \( x_{et} M_t \), fraction \( \delta_e \) stolen, \( \mathbb{E} \exp(z')^{\rho - 1} = \eta_e \frac{Z_t^{\rho - 1}}{M_t} \)

2. New products by incumbent firms, \( h(x_{mt}) M_t \), \( \delta_m \) stolen, \( \mathbb{E} \exp(z')^{\rho - 1} = \eta_m \frac{Z_t^{\rho - 1}}{M_t} \)

3. Improvements of incumbents’ products, if continue, \( \mathbb{E} \exp(z')^{\rho - 1} = \zeta(x_{ct}) \frac{Z_t^{\rho - 1}}{M_t} \)

Evolution of aggregate productivity

\[ Z_{t+1}^{\rho - 1} = [(1 - \delta_{ct}) \zeta(x_{ct}) + \eta_m h(x_{mt}) + \eta_e x_{et}] \frac{Z_t^{\rho - 1}}{M_t} M_t \]

Product exit

\[ \delta_{ct} = \delta_0 + \delta_m h(x_{mt}) + \delta_e x_{et} \]
Product-level innovation technologies imply tractable equilibrium aggregation:

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$$Z_t^{\rho-1} = [(1 - \delta_{ct}) \zeta(x_{ct}) + \eta_m h(x_{mt}) + \eta_e x_{et}] \frac{Z_t^{\rho-1}}{M_t} M_t$$

Product exit

$$\delta_{ct} = \delta_0 + \delta_m h(x_{mt}) + \delta_e x_{et}$$
Impact Elasticities

Start from

$$\log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = G(x_{ct}, x_{mt}, x_{et}) \quad \text{where} \quad x_{ct} + x_{mt} + x_{et} = Y_{rt}$$

Differentiating

$$\log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t - \bar{g}_Z \approx \Theta (\log Y_{rt} - \log \bar{Y}_r)$$

$$\Theta = \frac{dx_c}{dY_r} \Theta_c + \frac{dx_m}{dY_r} \Theta_m + \frac{dx_e}{dY_r} \Theta_e$$

where $$\Theta_i = G_i(\bar{x}_c, \bar{x}_m, \bar{x}_e) \bar{Y}_r$$ and $$\frac{dx_c}{dY_r} + \frac{dx_m}{dY_r} + \frac{dx_e}{dY_r} = 1$$

Now no single measure of $$\Theta$$
Plan for measurement in full model

Two scenarios under which

\[ \Theta \leq \Theta_e \]

- Conditional Efficiency
- Proportional Policy Change

Concavity of \( G \) in \( x_e \) implies

\[ \Theta_e \leq (\bar{g}_Z - G(\bar{x}_c, \bar{x}_m, 0)) \frac{\bar{Y}_r}{\bar{x}_e} \]

- Contribution of entrants’ to growth \( \bar{g}_Z - G(\bar{x}_c, \bar{x}_m, 0) \)
- Entrant’s share of innovative investment \( \bar{x}_e / \bar{Y}_r \)
Conditional Efficiency

\[ Y_r^* = \min x_c + x_m + x_e \]

\[ G(x_c, x_m, x_e) = \bar{g}_Z \]

If \( \bar{Y}_r = Y_r^* \)

\[ \Theta = \Theta_c = \Theta_m = \Theta_e \]

\[ \Theta = \frac{dx_c}{dY_r} \Theta_c + \frac{dx_m}{dY_r} \Theta_m + \frac{dx_e}{dY_r} \Theta_e \]

Allocation of investment doesn’t matter. Dynamics from simple model go through
Equilibrium first order conditions at any date $t$ when $x_{et} > 0$

\[ Y_{rt} = x_{ct} + x_{mt} + x_{et} \]

\[ \frac{(1 - \tau'_{mt})}{(1 - \tau'_{et})} \eta_e = \eta_m h' (x_{mt}) \]

\[ \frac{(1 - \tau'_{ct})}{(1 - \tau'_{et})} \eta_e = (1 - \delta_{ct}) \zeta' (x_{ct}) \]

\[ \log Z_{t+1} - \log Z_t = G(x_{ct}, x_{mt}, x_{et}) \]

Policy ratios constant over time implies a time-invariant mapping $Y_{rt}$ to $g_{Zt}$

\[ \frac{1 - \tau'_{ct}}{1 - \tau'_{et}} = \frac{1 - \bar{\tau}'_{c}}{1 - \bar{\tau}'_{e}} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1 - \tau'_{mt}}{1 - \tau'_{et}} = \frac{1 - \bar{\tau}'_{m}}{1 - \bar{\tau}'_{e}} \]
General Policy Changes

\[ \Theta = \frac{dx_c}{dY_r} \Theta_c + \frac{dx_m}{dY_r} \Theta_m + \frac{dx_e}{dY_r} \Theta_e \]

Policy ratios constant over time implies imply

\[ \frac{dx_c}{dY_r}, \frac{dx_m}{dY_r}, \frac{dx_e}{dY_r} \text{ constant over time} \]

Transition Dynamics around new BGP allocation of investment

\[ \log Z'_{t+1} - \log \tilde{Z}_{t+1} \approx \sum_{k=0}^{t} \Gamma'_{k} \left[ \log l'_{r-t-k} - \log \bar{l}_r - (\log \bar{Y}'_r - \log \bar{Y}_r) \right] \]

\[ \Gamma'_0 = \Theta' \text{ and } \Gamma'_{k+1} = [1 - (1 - \phi)\Theta'] \Gamma'_k \]

Efficiency gain from reallocation of investment: \( \log \bar{Y}'_r - \log \bar{Y}_r \)

But need to know old and new BGP allocation of investment
With proportional policy changes, allocation of innovative investment is the same on the old and new BGP.

\[ \Theta' = \Theta \quad \bar{Y}_r' = \bar{Y}_r \]

Implies results from simple model apply

With regularity conditions \( \Theta_e \leq \Theta_c \)

Proportional increase in innovation subsidies \( \uparrow x_e \) and \( \downarrow x_c \) \( \implies \Theta \leq \Theta_e \)
Need to measure $\phi$ and $\Theta \leq \Theta_e \leq (\bar{g}_Z - G(\bar{x}_c, \bar{x}_m, 0)) \frac{\bar{y}_r}{\bar{x}_e}$

1. Intertemporal Knowledge Spillovers $\phi$
   - $\phi = 0.96$ — $\approx$ endogenous growth
   - $\phi = -1.6$ — Fernald and Jones (2014)

2. Contribution of Entrants to Growth
   - with no business stealing $= \frac{1}{\rho - 1}$ employment share of entering firms
   - estimates of $\bar{g}_Z - G(\bar{x}_c, \bar{x}_m, 0)$ from GHK and Akcigit and Kerr (2016)

3. Share of entrants’ innovation expenditure in total innovation expenditure
   - NIPA measures of innovation expenditures of incumbent firms
   - impute investment in entry equal to value of entering firms
Measurement

Three quantities to be measured

1. **Intertemporal Knowledge Spillovers** $\phi$
   
   - $\phi = 0.96 \approx \text{endogenous growth}$
   - $\phi = -1.6 \quad \text{Fernald and Jones (2014)}$

2. **Contribution of Entrants to Growth**
   
   - $\frac{1}{\rho-1} \frac{\text{employment share of entering firms}}{\bar{g}_Z} = \frac{0.027}{3} = 0.009$
   - $\text{AK 2016} \quad \frac{\bar{g}_Z - G(\bar{x}_c, \bar{x}_m, 0)}{\bar{g}_Z} = 0.257 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \bar{g}_Z - G(\bar{x}_c, \bar{x}_m, 0) = 0.0037$

3. **Share of entrants’ innovation expenditure in total innovation expenditure**
   
   - incumbent firms invest 6.1% of output in innovation
   - imputed innovative investment of entering firms 3.1% of output
Implied parameter values

1. Intertemporal Knowledge Spillovers $\phi$
   - $\phi = 0.96$ — $\approx$ endogenous growth
   - $\phi = -1.6$ — Fernald and Jones (2014)

2. Impact Elasticity
   - $\Theta = \Theta_e = 0.026$ — no business stealing
   - $\Theta \leq \Theta_e = 0.01$ — AK 2016

3. Ratio of growth rate to interest rate and physical capital share
   - $\tilde{\beta} = 0.986$
   - $\alpha = 0.25$
Uniform subsidy to innovative investment to permanently raise research labor log $I_r - \log \bar{I}_r$ by 0.10

Innovation intensity of the economy up by 1.1 percentage point

Long run fiscal cost of 1.1 percentage point of output

Path of Productivity and Output over 100 years

Path of Productivity and Output over 20 years

Welfare Impact
Productivity and Output over 100 years

**Aggregate productivity (low \(\phi\))**

- No business stealing
- Business stealing

**Aggregate productivity (high \(\phi\))**

**Aggregate Output (low \(\phi\))**

- No business stealing
- Business stealing

**Aggregate Output (high \(\phi\))**
Productivity and Output over 20 years
Hard to distinguish from business cycles
### Welfare implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare (equivalent variation)</th>
<th>$\phi = -1.6$</th>
<th>$\phi = 0.96$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Bus. stealing $\Theta = 0.026$</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK $\Theta = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.073</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>$\phi = 0.96$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Bus. stealing $\Theta = 0.026$</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK $\Theta = 0.01$</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- A tractable model
- Guide for measurement
- Results consistent with time series evidence
- Long term gains from innovation policy possibly large
- Near-term gains from innovation policy must likely come from reallocation