

DUTCH DISEASE — HOW MUCH SICKNESS, HOW MUCH BOON?

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This paper sets out a very simple neo-classical, small-country, open-economy model with non-tradeable goods, tradeables other than oil, and oil. Using the comparative static version of the model it is shown that a rise in the world price of oil must, *ceteris paribus*, cause the price level of non-tradeables to rise if a fixed exchange rate is maintained. Using the dynamic version of the model it is shown that the path of the non-tradeables price level in response to an oil shock may carry it through substantial overshooting before the final equilibrium is reached. However, it is also shown that the degree of overshooting can be reduced dramatically by the simple expedient of seeing to it that the increase in spending generated by the added revenues takes place gradually through time, rather than precipitously. In this way the rise in the domestic price level caused by the oil shock can be limited (for practical purposes) to approximately the amount dictated by the degree of appreciation of the real exchange rate necessary to restore equilibrium.

1. Introduction

The term 'Dutch disease' was coined to describe the reaction that an economy can have to the emergence of a new major export industry, or, alternatively, to a significant rise in the international price of one or more existing exports.

In the present paper we develop a simple model to analyze the 'export boom' phenomenon. The model, probably the simplest that can be devised to handle the problem, covers all its essential components. Its equations distinguish between 'oil' (the export boom product), the production of tradeables other than oil, the demand for tradeables other than oil, and the supply and demand for home goods (non-tradeables).

*Author's note: This paper was written during August and September, 1981, while I was serving as a consultant to the Ministry of Finance of Indonesia under the auspices of the Harvard Institute of International Development (to both of which institutions I am grateful for permission to publish). The study was done under circumstances and time constraints which precluded any careful examination of the literature. When, later, I attempted to remedy this deficiency, I found the task of distilling and summarizing the existing work on the general topic of Dutch disease, and of relating it to my own contribution, to be more formidable by far than the work that culminated in the present paper. Certainly such a task would merit, at this stage of development of the literature, an independent review article. Under the circumstances, I have decided to include a bibliography of work on Dutch disease and related subjects, containing the contributions that have come to my attention. The large number of papers there listed itself suggests that I have not uncovered all that has been done. I have therefore called it a partial bibliography on Dutch disease and related topics.

In section 2 the simplest version of this model is considered, in which only comparative static solutions emerge. This model is evolved in the context of a fixed exchange rate economy, but this really plays no role in the final solutions for relative prices and real quantities. The use of the assumption of a fixed exchange rate is nothing more than the choice of foreign currency as the 'numeraire' of the system. Other choices of numeraire (e.g., the wage rate or the money supply) would yield the identical results (for real quantities and relative prices).

In section 3 of the paper certain monetary dynamics are explored. Here the assumption of fixed exchange rates is again made, but now it has more substantive content, as there is no reason why the dynamic process under a fixed exchange rate system should match the one that would exist under, say, a flexible rate system. The final equilibria should be the same, but the time paths by which those equilibria are approached can easily differ. Indeed, even when the exchange rate is specified to be fixed, many alternative dynamic processes could be compatible with it. In our exercises, we will use processes that we believe to be plausible.

2. The 'real' model

We posit an economy described by the following equations for

Home Goods Demand:

$$H^d = a_0 - a_1(P_h - P_t) + a_2 Y, \quad (1)$$

which depends on the price of home goods (P_h) relative to that of tradeables (P_t) and on the level of real output (Y) (initial prices are calibrated to 1.0, hence $P_h - P_t$ approximates the corresponding price ratio; note, too, that a_1 is defined to be positive).

Home Goods Supply:

$$H^s = b_0 + b_1(P_h - w), \quad (2)$$

which depends on the price of home goods (P_h) relative to the level of factor costs or wages (w).

Tradeable Goods Supply:

$$T^s = c_0 + c_1(P_t - w), \quad (3)$$

which depends on the price level of tradeable goods (P_t) relative to the level of factor costs or wages (w).

National Real Product Generated by 'Oil' (O):

$$Z = P_0 O, \quad (4)$$

where the oil economy of the country is assumed to have a life of its own. Output is exogenous in the sense that it is the product of past discoveries, and the world price is also taken to be exogenous. The disturbance to be analyzed is a change (dZ) assumed to come from a rise in oil prices.

Real Output:

$$y = H^s + T^s + Z, \quad (5)$$

note that we assume the world price of non-oil tradeables to be exogenous and constant over the exercise.

Factor Costs or Wages:

$$w = f_1 P_h + (1 - f_1) P_t, \quad f_1 = b_1 / (b_1 + c_1), \quad (6)$$

which is an index of the variable costs that are relevant in the production of H^s and T^s . As the oil sector is assumed to be able to command the resources it desires, we build in the assumption that sectors H and T compete for the remaining resources. Thus $dH^s = b_1(dP_h - dw) = -dT^s = -c_1(dP_t - dw)$. With $dP_t = 0$, this means $b_1 dP_h - b_1 dw = +c_1 dw$, or $dw = b_1 dP_h / (b_1 + c_1)$.

Demand for Tradeables:

$$T^d = a_0 + a_1(P_h - P_t) + (1 - a_2) Y, \quad (7)$$

where it is assumed that all income is spent — either consumed or invested — on either tradeables or home goods. Hence the coefficient of Y in the tradeables demand equation is 1 minus its coefficient in the home-goods demand equation. The standard 'Slutsky condition' on compensated price effects requires that $\partial T^d / \partial P_h = \partial H^d / \partial P_t$. Using a_1 as the coefficient of $(P_h - P_t)$ ensures this.

Balance of Trade:

$$B = T^s + Z - T^d, \quad (8)$$

which is usually defined as exports minus imports. This is equal to non-oil exports + oil exports minus imports. Add to non-oil exports the home

consumption of home-produced exportables and the home consumption of home-produced importables; this is the supply of tradeables. Add the same two items to imports to get the demand for tradeables. Thus the trade balance can be expressed as shown.

World Price of Tradeables:

$$P_t = \bar{P}_t \quad (9)$$

which is taken as exogenous, and (implicitly) the exchange rate is taken as given. This equation thus defines the numeraire of the system. Alternatively, a different numeraire could be chosen; P_t would then be defined as $P_t = E\bar{P}_t$, where \bar{P}_t is the price of tradeables in world prices and E is the exchange rate.

Demand for Money:

$$M^d = kyw, \quad (10)$$

which is a version of the 'Cambridge equation' where the price level relevant for money demand is defined to be the level of wages (or unit factor costs).

Supply of Money:

$$M^s = M^d, \quad (11)$$

with a fixed exchange rate, the money supply (in equilibrium) is beyond the control of the monetary authorities, as long as they do not modify the pattern of trade distortions. The dynamic version of the model (see section 3), however, permits transitory divergences of M^s from M^d .

The solution of this model, starting from an initial situation in which $P_h = P_t = P_0 = w = 1$, is extraordinarily simple. Given the fact that $dH^s = -dT^s$ [see under eq. (6)], it follows that $dy = dZ$. The fact that dP_t is zero allows us, from eq. (6), to set $dw = f_1 dp_h$. With these two results, we equate dH^d and dH^s , from eqs. (1) and (2), as follows:

$$dH^d = -a_1 dP_h + a_2 dZ = b_1 dP_h(1 - f_1) = dH^s, \quad (12)$$

$$dp_h = \frac{a_2 dZ}{a_1 + b_1(1 - f_1)}. \quad (13)$$

This can be converted into more familiar elasticities using the following

subscripts formulas:

$$\sigma_h = \text{income elasticity of demand for home goods} = a_2 y / H^d,$$

$$\eta_h = \text{price elasticity of demand for home goods} = a_1 / H^d,$$

$$\varepsilon_h = \text{price elasticity of supply of home goods} = b_1 / H^s.$$

Eq. (13) then becomes

$$dp_h = \frac{\sigma_h(dZ/y)}{\eta_h + \varepsilon_h(1 - f_1)}. \quad (14)$$

Table 1 shows, for illustrative but plausible values of σ , η , and ε , the equilibrium change in the price of home goods relative to that of non-oil tradeables. The conclusions are quite clear. In general a rise in world oil price sufficient by itself to increase real national income by 10 percent will necessarily raise home goods prices relative to those of tradeables. But given the magnitude of the shock, the size of the effect on home goods prices is surprisingly modest. Only in two cases out of the fourteen examined is this effect larger than 10 percent.

Table 1

Changes in the equilibrium price level of home goods relative to the price level of non-oil tradeables, for an oil shock equal to 10 percent of national income.

Assumed parameters		Elasticity of supply of price	Weight of home-goods prices in wage index (f_1)	New equilibrium price level after oil shock ($P_h^* = 1.00$)
Elasticities of demand for home goods				
Income	Price			
1	1	1	0.75	1.08
1	1	2	0.75	1.067
1	2	2	0.75	1.04
1	2	1	0.75	1.044
1	1	1	0.75	1.088
1	1	1	0.75	1.13
1	1	1	0.75	1.16
0.6	1	1	0.75	1.048
0.6	1	2	0.75	1.040
0.6	2	2	0.75	1.024
0.6	2	1	0.75	1.026
0.6	1	1	0.75	1.053
0.6	1	1	0.75	1.078
0.6	1	1	0.75	1.096

Table 2 explores another effect of interest of students of 'Dutch disease'. Obviously, a rise in home goods prices, relative to those of tradeables, creates an incentive to shift resources out of the production of tradeables and into that of home goods. It was, indeed, the decline in industrial output in the Netherlands that led to the baptism of 'Dutch disease'. The final column of table 2 depicts, for the combinations of parameters given, the amount of those shifts, expressed in percentage points of total initial national product. Here again the results are reassuring, with the resource shift in all cases being the equivalent of 2 percent of national output or less.

Also worthy of note is the fact that the results of table 2 depend only on the relative values of the price elasticities. That is to say, a doubling or halving of all price elasticities leaves the amount of the resource shift unchanged. This is evident once the expression for dp_h is inserted into eq. (2) [using eq. (6)], leading to

$$\begin{aligned} dH^s &= H^s E_1 dP_h(1-f_1) = \frac{H^s \varepsilon_h \sigma_h (1-f_1)}{\eta_h + \varepsilon_h (1-f_1)} \left(\frac{dZ}{y} \right), \\ \frac{dH^s}{y} &= \left(\frac{H^s}{y} \right) \frac{\varepsilon_h \sigma_h (1-f_1)}{\eta_h + \varepsilon_h (1-f_1)} \left(\frac{dZ}{y} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

Table 2

Amount of resources shifted out of this production of non-oil tradeables and into the production of home goods as a consequence of an oil shock equal to 10 percent of national income.

Assumed parameters		Elasticity of supply price	Weight of home-goods prices in wage index (f_1)	Amount of resources shifted as percent of initial national product ($H^s_0 = 60$; $T^d_0 = 20$; $y_0 = 100$)
Elasticities of demand for home goods	Price			
1	1	1	0.75	1.2
1	1	2	0.75	2.0
1	2	2	0.75	1.2
1	2	1	0.75	0.66
1	1	1	0.75	0.66
1	1	1	0.75	2.0
1	1	1	0.75	1.2
0.6	1	1	0.75	0.72
0.6	1	2	0.75	1.2
0.6	2	2	0.75	0.72
0.6	2	1	0.75	0.40
0.6	1	1	0.75	0.40
0.6	1	1	0.75	1.2
0.6	1	1	0.75	0.72

3. Adding monetary dynamics to the 'real' model

It takes little adaptation in order to introduce a plausible dynamics into the model of section 2. The principal changes are:

- To eliminate the requirement of continuous equality between money demand (M^d) and money supply (M^s). Instead we add terms to the demand equations for home goods and for tradeables; these terms state the increment to the demand for each of the two classes of goods that will take place as a consequence of the existence of a supply of money greater than what people want to hold (and vice versa for a shortfall in the money supply).
- To introduce a dynamic equation for the money supply, in which changes in international reserves cause the money supply to change in the same direction. In the simulations presented here, we work with the equation $M_j = M_{j-1} + B_j$, where M_j is the money supply at the end of period j and B_j is the balance of trade during period j . But with equal ease one can incorporate explicitly a distinction between money on the one hand and the monetary base on the other, with a 'money multiplier' as the link between the two.

- To introduce plausible lag patterns in the equations of the basic model. The establishment of specifically 'timed' relationships is, of course, essential once a dynamic focus is adopted. The key lagged relationships are:
 - demand for home goods (H^d_j) and demand for tradeables (T^d_j) depend on last period's income (y_{j-1}) and on this period's relative prices ($P_{h,j} - P_{t,j}$).
 - transitory components in the demand for home goods (H^d_j) and for tradeables (T^d_j) appear whenever ($M^{s,j-1} - M^{d,j-1}$) is different from zero. These transitory components of demand are proportional to ($M^{s,j-1} - M^{d,j-1}$).
 - the wage of one period is based on the previous period's price levels of home goods and of tradeables.

The dynamic model is presented explicitly below, with j as the index for the time period.

Home Goods Demand:

$$H^d_j = a_0 - a_1(P_{h,j} - P_{t,j}) + a_2 y_{j-1} + a_3(M^{s,j-1} - M^{d,j-1}), \quad (1')$$

Home Goods Supply:

$$H_j^s = b_0 + b_1(P_{kj} - w_j), \quad H_j^s = H_j^d, \quad (2)$$

Tradeable Goods Supply:

$$T_j^s = c_0 + c_1(P_{ij} - w_j), \quad (3)$$

National Product Generated by Oil (O)

$$Z_j = P_{oj}O_j, \quad (4)$$

Real Output:

$$y_j = H_j^s + T_j^s + Z_j, \quad (5)$$

Factor Costs or Wages:

$$w_j = f_1 P_{kj-1} + (1 - f_1) P_{i,j-1}, \quad (6)$$

Demand for Tradeables:

$$T_j^d = e_0 + a_1(P_{kj} - P_{ij}) + (1 - a_2)y_{j-1} + e_3(M_{j-1}^d - M_{j-1}^s), \quad (7)$$

Balance of Trade:

$$B_j = T_j^s + Z_j - T_j^d, \quad (8)$$

World Price of Tradeables:

$$P_{ij} = \bar{P}_v, \quad (9)$$

Demand for Money:

$$M_j^d = k y_j [f_1 P_{kj} + (1 - f_1) P_{i,j}], \quad (10)$$

Supply of Money:

$$M_j^s = M_{j-1}^s + B_j, \quad (11')$$

There follow a series of simulations in which the dynamics implicit in the above model are worked out under a number of alternative assumptions. Simulations 1, 2, and 3 are all based on the assumption that the elasticities of

demand and supply of home goods are equal to one, and that the income elasticities of both goods as well as the supply elasticity of tradeables are also equal to unity. (The demand elasticity for tradeables is 1.5 in these simulations, as determined by the Slutsky condition.)

In Simulation 1, it is posited that when the money supply is greater (less) than what people want to hold, they eliminate the excess (shortfall) in just one period. In Simulation 2, it is assumed that they only eliminate half of the excess or shortfall in the first period; then they eliminate half of any excess or shortfall that remains in the second period, etc.

In the three simulations, 1, 2, and 3, the equilibrium values of all the variables are the same. The dynamic paths of the variables, however, differ among these simulations, because the speed with which excess money is spent is slower in Simulations 2 and 3 than in Simulation 1, and because the pattern in which excess money is spent differs as between Simulations 2 and 3. In Simulation 1, for example, the price level of home goods (P_h) rises to a maximum of 1.125 times the price level of tradeables, before adjusting (in a damped oscillatory process) to its final equilibrium level of 1.08 times P_t . In Simulation 2, P_h rises only to a maximum of 1.113 times P_t . This is exclusively due to the slower process of working off excess money balances.

Simulation 3 begins a series of experiments in which we make a conscious effort to increase both the response of P_h to the oil shock in the final equilibrium and the degree to which P_h overshoots its final equilibrium level in the process of adjustment. The first experiment (Simulation 3) involves increasing the share of excess money balances which is spent on home goods, and reducing correspondingly the share spent on tradeables. This should have the effect of 'bottling up' excess balances within the economy, and causing a somewhat greater overshoot. This is indeed the case, with P_h reaching 1.123 in Simulation 3 as against 1.114 in Simulation 2, but the magnitude of the effect is obviously not very great.

In Simulation 4 we extend the same sort of adjustment to the marginal proportions in which income is spent (for consumption and investment). These are changed (as against Simulation 3) from 0.6 and 0.4 for home goods and tradeables, respectively, to 0.8 and 0.2, implying an income elasticity of demand for home goods (in the neighborhood of the initial equilibrium) of 1.33, and an income elasticity of 0.5 for tradeables. This sort of pattern of income elasticities is quite implausible, as in general luxury goods tend to be concentrated among the tradeables. Yet the assumption is made in order to test the sensitivity of the results. In the particular case examined in Simulation 4, the equilibrium level of P_h moves from 1.08 to 1.107, while the maximum point on its time path shifts upward somewhat more sharply, from 1.123 to 1.184.

Simulations 5 and 6 experiment with changing price elasticities. Both are to be compared with Simulation 4. Starting from this base, Simulation 5 cuts

in half all four price elasticities (those of supply and demand for both home goods and tradeables), while Simulation 6 reduces by one half only the two demand elasticities.

The effect of cutting price elasticities is much more marked than those of our earlier experiments. In Simulation 5 the equilibrium value of P_h moves up from 1.107 in Simulation 4 to 1.213, while its maximum value moves from 1.162 to 1.340.

Simulation 6 produces an equilibrium value of P_h equal to 1.178, as compared with 1.107 for Simulation 4. The increase in the maximum value is even sharper—from 1.162 to 1.297. It appears, then, that reducing demand elasticities has stronger effects in generating 'overshooting' than does a corresponding reduction of supply elasticities. [That changes in demand elasticities have a stronger effect on equilibrium values than corresponding changes in supply elasticities is evident from eq. (14). It is not self-evident that this should be true for the degree of overshooting as well, but that is the conclusion suggested by the comparison of Simulations 5 and 6.]

4. Introducing lags in supply response, plus greater long-run elasticity

In this section we try to zero in somewhat more carefully on parameter patterns that are likely to reflect reality. These diverge somewhat from the patterns used in earlier sections, which were intended mainly for the purpose of assessing the sensitivity of our results to changes in the values of particular parameters.

4.1. Income elasticity of demand: 1.25 for tradeables, 0.83 for home goods

These assumptions imply that marginal income is spent half on tradeables and half on home goods. Since the initial average propensities to spend (i.e., consume and invest) on the two classes of goods are 0.4 and 0.6, the stated elasticities emerge from the definition of income elasticity (=marginal propensity divided by average propensity). These figures were chosen because of our conviction that in general (for less developed countries) tradeable goods are somewhat more likely to fall in the luxury ($\sigma > 1$) category than non-tradeables, while at the same time the income elasticities of expenditure on all goods and services have to average to one.

4.2. Price elasticity of demand: 0.6 for tradeables, 0.4 for home goods

These assumptions imply a unitary elasticity of substitution between tradeables and non-tradeables. It is unlikely that the true elasticity is significantly greater than this, if only for the reason that any good that is a close substitute for an import or export commodity would normally be

classified with the tradeables. (The relative sizes of the two elasticities are determined by the Slutsky condition; they must be inversely proportional to the budget shares of the two groups of goods, and their sum must be equal to the elasticity of substitution.)

4.3. Price elasticities of supply: Between 2.0 and 5.0 in the long run

We know both from individual industry studies and from simulations that the elasticities of supply of individual industries as well as of large sectors of the economy tend to be significantly greater than unity. (In general, low elasticities appear only when activities are characterized by severe natural resource constraints.) At the same time, we know that there are severe limits to the amount by which the bulk of activities can be expanded within a short time (say, a year or so). Both of these appreciations of reality can be incorporated into our simulations by introducing lagged price terms in the supply function. In what follows we shall use the following lag distributions:

4L	0.25,	0.25,	0.25,	0.25		
4D	0.40,	0.30,	0.20,	0.10		
6L	0.167,	0.167,	0.167,	0.167,	0.165	
6D	0.35,	0.25,	0.16,	0.12,	0.08,	0.04.

This means that, for 4L, one-fourth of the total long-run effect of the change in price takes place in the first period (which in setting up the dynamics I have thought of as being something like a year); one-half takes place by the end of the second period, three-fourths by the end of the third, and the full effect by the end of the fourth period. For lag pattern 6L, the initial response is one-sixth of the long-run response, and an additional one-sixth is added each period. For the lag pattern 4D, we have 40 percent of the total response in the first period, 70 percent by the end of the second, 90 percent by the end of the third and 100 percent by the end of the fourth. In pattern 6D these cumulative percentages of the total effect are, for successive periods, 35, 60, 76, 88, 96, and 100 percent. We believe that these four response patterns are sufficiently different from each other to give us a good sense of how our results respond to plausible differences in response patterns, while at the same time reflecting our belief that long run supply elasticities are significantly greater than we would infer from the first period response.

4.4. Coefficients of $(M^* - M^d) = 0.25, 0.25$, or, alternatively, 0.5, 0.5

These coefficients dictate the fraction of 'excess money supply' that will be reflected in spending on each of the two categories of goods within one

period. Thus in the first case it is assumed that one quarter of the excess is spent on home goods, one quarter on tradeables, within one period. If this is the pattern, three-fourths of a given excess supply would be worked off after two periods, seven-eighths after three periods, etc., assuming no intervening or additional disturbances.

The alternative assumption, that all the excess is spent within one period, requires no elaboration.

4.5. The money multiplier (money/international reserves)

The monetary mechanism that is built into our simulations is that of a fixed exchange rate system. The ultimate reserves of such a system are gold and foreign currency, and they are acquired through surpluses in the balance of payments (balance of trade in the case of our model, since we abstract from voluntary capital movements). A money multiplier of unity is implicit in the equation $M_t^j = M_{t-1}^j + B_t$. To introduce a different multiplier, μ , this is altered to $M_t^j = M_{t-1}^j + \mu B_t$. In table 4 we explore the consequences of changing μ from 1.0 to 1.5.

4.6. The oil shock

In each of tables 3 and 4, allowance is made for the possibility of 'spreading' over time the response of the economy to the oil shock. This is accomplished by spending in the first period only a relatively small part of the shock, followed by steadily increasing fractions in subsequent periods, until finally the full effect of the assumed increment of oil prices is reflected. Three alternative patterns are explored:

- Full Immediate Impact* (20,30,30,...). Here the contribution of oil proceeds, which starts at 20 percent of the national product, goes immediately to 30 percent, and stays there.
- Declining Increments* (20,24,27,29,30,...). Here the path from a 20 percent to a 30 percent contribution of oil is spread out over four years, with successively smaller increments being reflected each year.
- Equal Increments* (20,22,24,26,28,30,...). Here the shock is spread over a five-year period with equal increments in each.

Obviously, patterns (b) and (c) would entail accumulation of foreign reserves, if the actual oil-price rise was such as to permit pattern (a). The cumulative reserve accumulation under pattern (b) would be equal to 10 percent of GDP; that is, equal in size to one year's contribution of the oil shock itself. In the case of pattern (c) this accumulation of reserves would amount to 20 percent of GDP, or twice the annual contribution of the oil

Table 3
Maximum level reached by P_A during adjustment process; money multiplier = 1.

Oil shock	Supply elasticity = 2			
	4L	4D	6L	6D
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.25, 0.25$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.133	1.123	1.153	1.134
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.108	1.110	1.127	1.117
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.114	1.107	1.122	1.112
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.5, 0.5$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.167	1.129	1.204	1.139
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.105	1.104	1.124	1.112
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.115	1.105	1.121	1.109
Steady state = 1.093				
Maximum price rise/equilibrium price rise				
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.25, 0.25$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.46	1.32	1.65	1.44
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.16	1.18	1.37	1.26
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.23	1.15	1.31	1.20
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.5, 0.5$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.79	1.39	2.19	1.49
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.13	1.18	1.33	1.20
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.18	1.08	1.30	1.17
Supply elasticity = 5				
Lag pattern				
Oil shock	4L	4D	6L	6D
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.25, 0.25$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.082	1.069	1.104	1.077
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.064	1.063	1.082	1.069
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.064	1.060	1.072	1.065
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.5, 0.5$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.091	1.078	1.121	1.087
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.064	1.061	1.081	1.069
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.063	1.059	1.068	1.062
Steady state = 1.051				
Maximum price rise/equilibrium price rise				
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.25, 0.25$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.61	1.35	2.04	1.51
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.25	1.24	1.61	1.35
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.25	1.18	1.41	1.27
Coefficients of $(M^* - M^A) = 0.5, 0.5$				
20, 30, 30, ...	1.78	1.53	2.37	1.71
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.25	1.20	1.59	1.35
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.24	1.16	1.33	1.22

Table 4

Maximum level reached by P_h during adjustment process; money multiplier = 1.5.

Oil shock	Supply elasticity = 2		
	4L	4D	6L
			6D
Coefficients of $(M^s - M^d) = 0.25, 0.25$			
20, 30, 30, ...	1.153	1.137	1.187
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.113	1.110	1.133
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.117	1.109	1.124
Coefficients of $(M^s - M^d) = 0.5, 0.5$			
20, 30, 30, ...	1.153	1.160	1.261
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.113	1.100	1.121
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.120	1.107	1.122
	Steady state = 1.093		
Supply elasticity = 5			
			6D
Coefficients of $(M^s - M^d) = 0.25, 0.25$			
20, 30, 30, ...	1.091	1.078	1.115
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.068	1.064	1.087
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.065	1.061	1.072
Coefficients of $(M^s - M^d) = 0.5, 0.5$			
20, 30, 30, ...	1.091	1.078	1.155
20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ...	1.064	1.061	1.081
20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, ...	1.065	1.051	1.071
	Steady state = 1.051		

shock. Thus, although the time periods of spreading differ relatively little as between patterns (b) and (c) the effective amount of spreading is substantially greater in the latter case.

4.7. Interpretation of tables 3 and 4

Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of 96 different simulations. We have focused on the maximum level reached by the price level of home goods during the initial overshoot (which invariably occurs in the cases investigated). The overshoot is, however, substantially more moderate than in the extreme examples of simulations 5 and 6. Moreover, adopting a gradual response to the oil shock succeeds in limiting the overshoot even further.

When a supply elasticity of 2 is used, and 25 percent of excess money holdings is spent on each good in each period, we are placed in the upper

panels of tables 3 and 4. With full immediate impact of the oil shock, the biggest overshoot carries P_h to a maximum of 1.153 in table 3 (lag pattern 6L). This is reduced to 1.127 and 1.122 under gradual response with declining or with equal increments. The overshoots in these cases are very modest indeed, because the steady state level of P_h is 1.093.

A similar exercise for table 4 yields an overshoot to 1.187 in the full immediate impact case, reduced to 1.133 and 1.124 when a gradual adaptation to the oil shock is imposed.

The story is similar for the other cases examined in tables 3 and 4. Under the 20, 24, 27, 29, 30, ... pattern of gradual response to an oil shock, the maximum level of P_h never reaches a level as high as 1.127 in the remaining panels of table 1 nor a level as high as 1.133 in the remaining panels of table 2.

When a long-run elasticity of supply of 5.0 is assumed (which I believe to be more plausible than 2.0 in any event), the maximum points on the time path of P_h are as follows:

Nature of response to oil shocks	From table 3	From table 4
Full immediate impact (20, 30, 30, ...)	1.121	1.155
Gradual, declining increments (20, 24, 27, 29, 30, 30, ...)	1.082	1.087
Gradual, equal increments (20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, ...)	1.072	1.072
Steady state (for reference)	1.051	1.051

The clear conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is that by adopting a gradual pattern of response to an oil shock the extent of overshooting can very likely be kept within modest and easily manageable limits.

5. Some concluding observations

The exercises that we have reported on here cover quite a wide range of possibilities, but obviously not the whole set of potentially interesting cases. In conversations with colleagues, I have found that the greatest interest in alternatives has to do with cases in which the government spends the 'oil money', Z , in a fashion somewhat different from that which our exercises have assumed.

The assumption implicit in our exercises is that the government spends the oil money in substantially the same pattern (as between tradeables and home

goods) as consumers would have chosen. This assumption would obviously also hold in the case where the government simply gives the money to consumers to spend, either via direct transfer payments or via reductions in taxes.

The results of such an exercise can easily be predicted, without actually going through the exercise of a simulation. The key feature is that money that is spent abroad simply has (in the context of the model) no feedback to the local economy. Suppose, for example, that all of the oil proceeds were spent for military equipment in the international market-place. It would be 'as if' y had stayed constant at 100, as far as economic agents other than the government and the military were concerned. Old exports and old imports would continue as before, in balance as before. New oil exports would balance new imports of military hardware. There would be no added income received at home that would bid up the prices of home goods or change the allocation of resources as between H^s and T^s . The oil windfall would simply have been translated into a military equipment windfall.

Now if the expenditure were not on military hardware, but, say on productive capital goods (a steel plant?), the results, as far as the model is concerned would be the same. Obviously the long-term growth of the economy would be different with a steel plant than with military hardware, but in the period while the steel plant was being built and even in its first years of operation when profits would probably not yet be generated, there would be no serious difference between the two cases, so far as their impact on P_h and the other variables in the model are concerned.

Now if instead of spending the incremental revenues fully on foreign goods (or, what is the same thing, on tradeables, regardless of where they are produced) they had been spent fully on home goods, the effects on P_h would be just double those recorded in tables 3 and 4. The reason is that if all the money is spent on home goods, that particular source of disturbance is precisely twice as great as the corresponding one analyzed in tables 3 and 4 (where half of the 'autonomous' expenditure of oil proceeds goes to buy tradeables). At the same time the size of the increment to foreign exchange availability (dZ) that is 'available' to help adjust the balance of payments is now, in a sense, also twice what it was before. In the cases analyzed in tables 3 and 4, half of the proceeds of the oil shock simply disappeared overseas in the first round, as it were. But if the full proceeds are spent on home goods, the full counterpart of that expenditure is available in the form of foreign currency, to bring about the consequent balance-of-payments adjustment.

SIMULATION 1 - $\epsilon_h = 1, \epsilon_f = 1, \eta_h = 1, \eta_f = 1, \sigma_h = 1, \sigma_f = 1, \alpha_3 = 0.6, \alpha_2 = 0.4$		SIMULATION 2 - $\epsilon_h = 1, \epsilon_f = 1, \eta_h = 1, \eta_f = 1, \sigma_h = 1, \sigma_f = 1, \alpha_3 = 0.6, \alpha_2 = 0.2$	
0	100.000	0	100.000
1	100.000	1	100.000
2	100.000	2	100.000
3	100.000	3	100.000
4	100.000	4	100.000
5	100.000	5	100.000
6	100.000	6	100.000
7	100.000	7	100.000
8	100.000	8	100.000
9	100.000	9	100.000
10	100.000	10	100.000
11	100.000	11	100.000
12	100.000	12	100.000
13	100.000	13	100.000
14	100.000	14	100.000
15	100.000	15	100.000
16	100.000	16	100.000
17	100.000	17	100.000
18	100.000	18	100.000
19	100.000	19	100.000
20	100.000	20	100.000
21	100.000	21	100.000
22	100.000	22	100.000
23	100.000	23	100.000
24	100.000	24	100.000
25	100.000	25	100.000
26	100.000	26	100.000
27	100.000	27	100.000
28	100.000	28	100.000
29	100.000	29	100.000
30	100.000	30	100.000
31	100.000	31	100.000
32	100.000	32	100.000
33	100.000	33	100.000
34	100.000	34	100.000
35	100.000	35	100.000
36	100.000	36	100.000
37	100.000	37	100.000
38	100.000	38	100.000
39	100.000	39	100.000
40	100.000	40	100.000
41	100.000	41	100.000
42	100.000	42	100.000
43	100.000	43	100.000
44	100.000	44	100.000
45	100.000	45	100.000
46	100.000	46	100.000
47	100.000	47	100.000
48	100.000	48	100.000
49	100.000	49	100.000
50	100.000	50	100.000
51	100.000	51	100.000
52	100.000	52	100.000
53	100.000	53	100.000
54	100.000	54	100.000
55	100.000	55	100.000
56	100.000	56	100.000
57	100.000	57	100.000
58	100.000	58	100.000
59	100.000	59	100.000
60	100.000	60	100.000
61	100.000	61	100.000
62	100.000	62	100.000
63	100.000	63	100.000
64	100.000	64	100.000
65	100.000	65	100.000
66	100.000	66	100.000
67	100.000	67	100.000
68	100.000	68	100.000
69	100.000	69	100.000
70	100.000	70	100.000
71	100.000	71	100.000
72	100.000	72	100.000
73	100.000	73	100.000
74	100.000	74	100.000
75	100.000	75	100.000
76	100.000	76	100.000
77	100.000	77	100.000
78	100.000	78	100.000
79	100.000	79	100.000
80	100.000	80	100.000
81	100.000	81	100.000
82	100.000	82	100.000
83	100.000	83	100.000
84	100.000	84	100.000
85	100.000	85	100.000
86	100.000	86	100.000
87	100.000	87	100.000
88	100.000	88	100.000
89	100.000	89	100.000
90	100.000	90	100.000
91	100.000	91	100.000
92	100.000	92	100.000
93	100.000	93	100.000
94	100.000	94	100.000
95	100.000	95	100.000
96	100.000	96	100.000
97	100.000	97	100.000
98	100.000	98	100.000
99	100.000	99	100.000
100	100.000	100	100.000

SIMULATION 3 — $\epsilon_1 = 1, \epsilon_2 = 1, \eta_1 = 1, \eta_2 = 1.5, \sigma_1 = 1, \sigma_2 = 0.4, \epsilon_3 = 0.1$

PERIOD	OIL	HOMEPRICE	INCOME	DHOMGDD	SHOMGDD	DIRGDD	STRGDD	TRD_BOP	DMONEY	SMONEY	MONEYDIF
1	0	1.0000	100.000	60.0000	60.0000	40.0000	20.0000	0.0000	20.0000	20.0000	0.0000
2	1	1.0000	110.000	60.0000	60.0000	40.0000	20.0000	10.0000	22.0000	20.0000	0.0000
3	2	1.0000	117.200	67.2000	67.2000	50.8000	20.0000	10.8000	27.6820	20.0000	0.0000
4	3	1.0000	122.988	72.9880	72.9880	53.9448	18.2000	15.7448	28.2000	23.4858	0.4808
5	4	1.0000	128.664	78.6640	78.6640	56.9078	17.2000	16.9078	28.2000	23.1778	0.4508
6	5	1.0000	134.232	84.2320	84.2320	59.7028	16.2000	17.9028	28.2000	22.8228	0.4408
7	6	1.0000	139.696	89.6960	89.6960	62.3528	15.2000	18.7528	28.2000	22.4228	0.4308
8	7	1.0000	145.064	95.0640	95.0640	64.8720	14.2000	19.4720	28.2000	22.0028	0.4208
9	8	1.0000	150.336	100.3360	100.3360	67.2720	13.2000	20.0720	28.2000	21.5828	0.4108
10	9	1.0000	155.512	105.5120	105.5120	69.5520	12.2000	20.5520	28.2000	21.1628	0.4008
11	10	1.0000	160.592	110.5920	110.5920	71.7120	11.2000	20.9120	28.2000	20.7428	0.3908
12	11	1.0000	165.576	115.5760	115.5760	73.7520	10.2000	21.1720	28.2000	20.3228	0.3808
13	12	1.0000	170.472	120.4720	120.4720	75.6720	9.2000	21.3420	28.2000	19.9028	0.3708
14	13	1.0000	175.280	125.2800	125.2800	77.4720	8.2000	21.4220	28.2000	19.4828	0.3608
15	14	1.0000	180.000	130.0000	130.0000	79.1520	7.2000	21.4120	28.2000	19.0628	0.3508
16	15	1.0000	184.632	134.6320	134.6320	80.7120	6.2000	21.3120	28.2000	18.6428	0.3408
17	16	1.0000	189.176	139.1760	139.1760	82.1520	5.2000	21.1220	28.2000	18.2228	0.3308
18	17	1.0000	193.632	143.6320	143.6320	83.4720	4.2000	20.8520	28.2000	17.8028	0.3208
19	18	1.0000	198.000	148.0000	148.0000	84.6720	3.2000	20.5020	28.2000	17.3828	0.3108
20	19	1.0000	202.272	152.2720	152.2720	85.7520	2.2000	20.0720	28.2000	16.9628	0.3008
21	20	1.0000	206.448	156.4480	156.4480	86.7120	1.2000	19.5720	28.2000	16.5428	0.2908
22	21	1.0000	210.528	160.5280	160.5280	87.5520	0.2000	19.0020	28.2000	16.1228	0.2808

SIMULATION 5 — $\epsilon_1 = 0.5, \epsilon_2 = 0.5, \eta_1 = 0.5, \eta_2 = 0.5, \sigma_1 = 1.33, \sigma_2 = 0.5, \epsilon_3 = 0.2$

SIMULATION 6 — $\epsilon_1 = 1, \epsilon_2 = 1, \eta_1 = 1, \eta_2 = 0.5, \sigma_1 = 1.33, \sigma_2 = 0.5, \epsilon_3 = 0.2$

PERIOD	OIL	HOMEPRICE	INCOME	DHOMGDD	SHOMGDD	DIRGDD	STRGDD	TRD_BOP	DMONEY	SMONEY	MONEYDIF
1	0	1.0000	100.000	60.0000	60.0000	40.0000	20.0000	0.0000	20.0000	20.0000	0.0000
2	1	1.0000	110.000	60.0000	60.0000	40.0000	20.0000	10.0000	22.0000	20.0000	0.0000
3	2	1.0000	117.200	67.2000	67.2000	50.8000	20.0000	10.8000	27.6820	20.0000	0.0000
4	3	1.0000	122.988	72.9880	72.9880	53.9448	18.2000	15.7448	28.2000	23.4858	0.4808
5	4	1.0000	128.664	78.6640	78.6640	56.9078	17.2000	16.9078	28.2000	23.1778	0.4508
6	5	1.0000	134.232	84.2320	84.2320	59.7028	16.2000	17.9028	28.2000	22.8228	0.4408
7	6	1.0000	139.696	89.6960	89.6960	62.3528	15.2000	18.7528	28.2000	22.4228	0.4308
8	7	1.0000	145.064	95.0640	95.0640	64.8720	14.2000	19.4720	28.2000	22.0028	0.4208
9	8	1.0000	150.336	100.3360	100.3360	67.2720	13.2000	20.0720	28.2000	21.5828	0.4108
10	9	1.0000	155.512	105.5120	105.5120	69.5520	12.2000	20.5520	28.2000	21.1628	0.4008
11	10	1.0000	160.592	110.5920	110.5920	71.7120	11.2000	20.9120	28.2000	20.7428	0.3908
12	11	1.0000	165.576	115.5760	115.5760	73.7520	10.2000	21.1720	28.2000	20.3228	0.3808
13	12	1.0000	170.472	120.4720	120.4720	75.6720	9.2000	21.3420	28.2000	19.9028	0.3708
14	13	1.0000	175.280	125.2800	125.2800	77.4720	8.2000	21.4220	28.2000	19.4828	0.3608
15	14	1.0000	180.000	130.0000	130.0000	79.1520	7.2000	21.4120	28.2000	19.0628	0.3508
16	15	1.0000	184.632	134.6320	134.6320	80.7120	6.2000	21.3120	28.2000	18.6428	0.3408
17	16	1.0000	189.176	139.1760	139.1760	82.1520	5.2000	21.1220	28.2000	18.2228	0.3308
18	17	1.0000	193.632	143.6320	143.6320	83.4720	4.2000	20.8520	28.2000	17.8028	0.3208
19	18	1.0000	198.000	148.0000	148.0000	84.6720	3.2000	20.5020	28.2000	17.3828	0.3108
20	19	1.0000	202.272	152.2720	152.2720	85.7520	2.2000	20.0720	28.2000	16.9628	0.3008
21	20	1.0000	206.448	156.4480	156.4480	86.7120	1.2000	19.5720	28.2000	16.5428	0.2908
22	21	1.0000	210.528	160.5280	160.5280	87.5520	0.2000	19.0020	28.2000	16.1228	0.2808

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