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**Personal Information**

Date of Birth: 3/15/79. Citizenship: US. Languages: English (native), Mandarin Chinese (fluent)

**Undergraduate Education**

B.A. in Economics (Honors), B.S. in Biochemistry (Highest Honors), UC Santa Cruz, 8/2001  
Non-degree study in Chinese Language, Taiwan Normal University, 9/2003-6/2005

**Graduate Education**

M.A., Economics, UCLA, 6/2006  
Ph.D., Economics, UCLA, 6/2010 (expected)

**Dissertation**

Title: "Essays on Manufacturing Productivity in 20<sup>th</sup> Century China"  
Dissertation Chair: Naomi Lamoreaux

**References**

Professor Naomi Lamoreaux, Department of Economics, UCLA,  
(310) 825-0225, [lamoreaux@econ.ucla.edu](mailto:lamoreaux@econ.ucla.edu)  
Associate Professor Daniel Akerberg, Department of Economics, UCLA,  
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Professor R. Bin Wong, Department of History, UCLA,  
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## **Fields**

Research: Economic History, Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics

Teaching: International Trade, Comparative Economic Systems, Development

## **Teaching Experience**

*Undergraduate Teaching Assistant*

Fall 2006 and Fall 2007, Introductory Microeconomics, Professor Anne Bresnock

Spring 2007, Intermediate Microeconomics, Professor Richard Buddin

Winter 2007, Statistics for Economists, Professor Rainer Winkelmann

## **Awards**

Pacific Rim Research Grant, University of California, 9/2009 – 6/2010 (ongoing)

Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Award, National Science Foundation, 7/2009 – 9/2009

Fulbright Fellowship, Institute of International Education, 8/2008 – 6/2009

Departmental Progress Award, University of California at Los Angeles, 9/2007

Center for Economic History Travel Award, University of California at Los Angeles, 6/2007

## **Professional Activities**

*Conference Presentations*

2008 Shanghai Forum, Fudan University

*Membership in Professional Organizations*

Economic History Association

## **Research Papers**

“Short-run Incentives and Myopic Behavior: Evidence From State-owned Enterprises in China”  
(Job Market Paper)

Abstract: How do links between pay and performance affect firm productivity? In 1978, Chinese industrial planners carried out major reforms of the compensation system in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), introducing bonuses which related pay to the fulfillment of short-run objectives. Previous studies have argued that strengthening incentives increased effort levels and led to large increases in productivity. However, incentives could have encouraged enterprises to misallocate effort by placing excessive emphasis on short-run targets and neglecting long-range activities. To test whether incentives led to myopic behavior, I collect a unique panel of compensation, employment, and output statistics and use these data to estimate the short-run and long-run effects of incentive use on labor productivity during the early period of SOE reform, 1976 to 1988. The results indicate that productivity gains were due to effort misallocation, rather than improvements in management. In the data, incentives were

associated with a small increase in labor productivity in the short-run, and a large decrease in labor productivity in the long-run.

“Do Local Institutions Affect All Foreign Direct Investors in the Same Way? Evidence from the Interwar Chinese Textile Industry”

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of local employment institutions on Japanese-, British-, and Chinese-owned textile firms operating in China during the 1920s and 1930s. Though firms in Britain had higher TFP levels than firms in Japan, Japanese-owned firms in China enjoyed an approximate 60 percent TFP advantage over their British-owned and Chinese-owned competitors. Japanese textile companies’ superior performance is explained by their use of proprietary knowledge to solve problems in Chinese labor institutions—problems that British- and Chinese-owned firms could not surmount. Though knowledge is usually thought of as a global public good, the case examined here indicates that the application of knowledge can be contingent on institutional factors. Where this is the case, countries sharing similar institutions will experience more productive transfers of knowledge.

**Research in Progress:**

“Capital Goods Autarky and the Implicit Price of Investment: The Experience of China, 1949-1990”