Econ 211A  Fall 2001

September 25

ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION AND GAMES

Course Outline and Reading Lists

 Econ 211A will focus primarily on decision-making under asymmetric information. We will begin the quarter with a look at a very simple example of mechanism design and then focus in depth on two major parts of the literature - - Screening/Signalling and Mechanism Design (one major topic will be auctions.)  The final weeks of the quarter will be on topics which you select.  

On Thursday of week 2, all students (whether formally enrolled or not) will be expected to hand in a copy of a recent paper (1990's) in a well known Journal and a 1-2 page discussion of why you think it might be worth exploring in more detail. It is not necessary to master the material at this point. The goal is simply to get you to look at what people are working on in the field of asymmetric information and decide what interests you. At a later date those enrolled will form teams and each team will write up a report on some topic (not necessarily the one you chose in week 1.)  You should take a look at the papers onthe class web-site to see some of the topics chosen in the last couple of years.  You may NOT choose these same papers!

Your grade in 211A will depend upon: (1) your Final Exam, (2) your homework exercises, and (3) the team project (4) participation in the discussions of the team presentations.

The "text book" is an introduction to a much wider range of topics than the ones we will cover in this course. My hope is that the book has been written clearly enough that you will find it a useful introduction to the broader literature.

Text book: Hirshleifer and Riley "The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information" Cambridge University Press, 1994

Other Books

Kreps, David M., "A Course in Microeconomic Theory," Princeton University Press (1989).

Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (MWG) "Microeconomic Theory," First Edition, Oxen, 1995

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economic Doctrine Macmillan (1987)

P. Klemperer (ed.) "The Economic Theory of Auctions"  Edward Elgar (2000)         

Module A: Introduction to Mechanism Design

E. Maskin and John Riley “Monopoly with Incomplete Information”  Rand Journal Summer 1984

Module B: Screening and Signalling

Module C: Mechanism Design and Auctions

In the final weeks every student will participate in a student presentation. Below you can see the reports from previous years.  This year you must pick some other paper or set of papers to review and explain.


Nobel Prize 2001

 

 

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