This is a slide show which summarizes the bidding in the first of the SPECTRUM AUCTIONS held by the F.C.C.
Economic theorists played the central role in designing this auction. There were 10 items for sale . The first 5 were similar "high-value" frequency bands. The next three were of medium value (less band width) and the final two were of least value. The goal was to design an auction which would allow a bidder wanting to purchase several band-width licenses, to be able to do so simultaneously, while competing with others only primarily interested In a particular license.
The major bidders are depicted in different colors. "Other bidders" are shown as gray. The slides show the current high bid at each round and the previous high bid.
There are some puzzles to be explained. Why did some bidders make "jump bids"? Why did some bidders raise themselves?
The following site is a library of (some) recent papers on AUCTIONS.
http://www.market-design.com/library.html