RESEARCH
Office: 8367 Bunche | riley@econ.ucla.edu | Ph. (310) 825-1541 |
Research papers listed below can be read on the internet. To access them, obtain the free plug-in to Netscape or Explorer directly from Adobe by clicking the link below.
If you wish to make use of the program to compute bidding strategies in auctions BIDCOMP3 please let me know.
1. A Resolution of the Tullock Paradox revised January 1998 View paper.
2. Uniqueness in Auctions, (with Eric Maskin) revised December 1996 View Paper
3. Auction Choice, (with Huagang Li) revised April 1999
Part A Theory and Numerical Analysis Part B Appendices
4. Silver Signals, revised May 2000, JEL (39) June 2001 pp 432-478, View Paper
5. Asymmetric Auctions, (with E. Maskin) October 98, RES 2000
6. Equilibrium in Sealed High-bid Auctions (with Eric Maskin) March, 2000, RES View Paper
7. Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions
(with Philip Haile and Sushil Bikhchandani) 2001
Games and Economic Behavior
View
Paper
8. Characterizing Asymmetric Auctions 1996 View Paper
9. Weak and Strong Signals 2002 View Paper
10 Reserve Price Signaling 2002 View Paper