RESEARCH

 

 

Office: 8367 Bunche riley@econ.ucla.edu Ph. (310) 825-1541

 


Research papers listed below can be read on the internet. To access them, obtain the free plug-in to Netscape or Explorer directly from Adobe by clicking the link below.

If you wish to make use of the program to compute bidding strategies in auctions BIDCOMP3 please let me know. 


1.     A Resolution of the Tullock Paradox revised January 1998 View paper

2.    Uniqueness in Auctions, (with Eric Maskin) revised December 1996 View Paper 

3.    Auction Choice, (with Huagang Li) revised April 1999

                      Part A  Theory  and Numerical Analysis  Part B Appendices

4.    Silver Signals, revised May 2000, JEL (39) June 2001 pp 432-478, View Paper 

5.    Asymmetric Auctions, (with E. Maskin) October 98, RES 2000  

6.    Equilibrium in Sealed High-bid Auctions (with Eric Maskin) March, 2000,  RES View Paper 

7.    Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions (with Philip Haile and Sushil Bikhchandani) 2001
       Games and Economic Behavior   View Paper

8.  Characterizing Asymmetric Auctions 1996  View Paper

9.   Weak and Strong Signals 2002 View Paper

10  Reserve Price Signaling  2002 View Paper


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