# The Information Economy 

Prices (or Lack Thereof)

## The Stages of Buying (The Marketing Funnel)



## Basic Monopoly Pricing

## Monopoly Pricing: Recap

- Constant marginal cost, c.
- Firm chooses quantity to maximize profits

$$
\Pi(q)=q(p(q)-c)
$$

- First-order condition

$$
M R(q)=c
$$

- Inverse elasticity rule

$$
\frac{p-c}{p}=\frac{1}{e} \quad \text { where } \quad e=-\frac{p}{q} \frac{d q}{d p}
$$

## Multi-product monopolist

- Microsoft sells Windows and MSOffice
- If sell separately optimal prices $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{w}}=200, \mathrm{p}_{\circ}=200$.
- But they sell both: how should they price them?
- Knopf sells Tony Blair's biography in Kindle and hardcover
- If sell separately optimal prices $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{k}}=10, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{h}}=20$.
- But they sell both: how should they price?
- Economist sells print and online editions
- How should they price?


## Multi-product monopolist

- Firm chooses $\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)$ to maximize

$$
\Pi\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)=q_{1}\left(p_{1}\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)-c_{1}\right)+q_{2}\left(p_{2}\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)-c_{2}\right)
$$

- Inverse elasticity rule for $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{I}}$

$$
\frac{p_{1}-c_{1}}{p_{1}}=\frac{1}{e_{11}}-\frac{\left(p_{2}-c_{2}\right) q_{2}}{p_{1} q_{1} e_{11}} e_{12} \text { where } e_{12}=-\frac{p_{1}}{q_{2}} \frac{d q_{2}}{d p_{1}}
$$

- Substitutes: $\mathrm{e}_{12}<0$
- Negative externality so increase $\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{I}}$.
- Complements: $\mathrm{e}_{12}>0$
- Positive externality so reduce $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{I}}$.


## Price Discrimination

## Three types of price discrimination

First-degree
Perfect price discrimination. Theoretical ideal.
Third-degree (group pricing)
Price as function of observables.
Examples: Student status, zip code, assets.
3. Second-degree (indirect price discrimination)

Offer menu of options and let people self-select.
Examples:Versioning, quantity discounts.
Pricing often has elements of both second- and thirddegree price discrimination.

## First-Degree Price Discrimination

- Suppose know customer's demand curve, p(q).
- Firm can extract all consumer surplus
, Let welfare maximizing quantity be $\mathrm{q}^{*}$, so that $\mathrm{p}\left(\mathrm{q}^{*}\right)=\mathrm{c}$.
- Three ways to extract

।. Block pricing: sell $\mathrm{q}^{*}$ units at $\mathrm{W}\left(\mathrm{q}^{*}\right)=\int_{0} \mathrm{q}^{*} \mathrm{p}(\mathrm{q}) \mathrm{dq}$
2. Two-part tariff: price $p=c$ and fee $\operatorname{CS}\left(q^{*}\right)=W\left(q^{*}\right)=\int_{0} q^{*}[p(q)-c] d q$
3. Nonlinear prices: Sell $q^{\text {th }}$ unit for price $\mathrm{p}(\mathrm{q})$.

- Big assumptions
- Know customers demand.
- Able to charge different prices to different customers.


## Third-Degree Price Discrimination

- Firm can observe customer characteristics
- Country (e.g.book prices)
- Student status (e.g. airline tickets)
- Individual pricing (e.g. Lexis-Nexis and Universities)
- Optimal pricing: Use inverse elasticity rule for each group.
- Lower price to most sensitive groups.
- Assumptions
- No resale (e.g. international editions of textbooks)
- No cost to setting different prices
- Cannot change characteristics (e.g. hide student card)
- No ethical issues (e.g. racial discrimination in car sales)
, Consumer demand and observable characteristics are correlated
- Has internet made easier or harder?


## Second-Degree Price Discrimination

- Offer menu of products and see which consumers choose
, High and low quality products (vertical differentiation).
- Indian and American textbook (horizontal differentiation).
- Quantity discounts.
- Big idea
- Choose options so different types of customers self-select.
- Want to separate groups that have differentWTP.
- Classic example: Coupons
- Put coupons in the newspaper.
- Annoying to cut out and bring to store.
, How does this raise profits? Why not just lower price?


## A Classic Example

It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches. [...] What the company is trying to do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich.

Jules Dupuit, 1849

## How to Price Discriminate

- Theory beautiful but intricate.
- See notes on website.
- Suppose two types of customers: high and low demand.

।. Set standard monopoly price $\mathrm{p}^{*}$ : agents choose $\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{H}}, \mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{L}}$.
b Consider selling as bundles of $q_{H}$ and $q_{L}$ units.
2. Get more money out of high type agent.

Raise price of high bundle until high type indifferent between high and low bundle.
3. Degrade lower bundle
b Lower $\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{L}}$ to make the low bundle unattractive to high type.
, Self-selection: lowering $\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{L}}$ is worse for high type than low.

## Practical Issues of Versioning

- How many versions?
, Want to cleanly separate consumers (e.g. business vs. leisure)
, Cost to maintaining different product lines.
- Customer confusion from too many options.
- Different options may reduce network effects.
- Degraded versions
- Need to ensure customers cannot undo (e.g. unlock software).
- Use degraded version to promote regular one (e.g. mathematica)
- Framing
- People like "middle" option.


## Other Topics

## Bundling

- Bundling is very common
- Bundling of functions (e.g. Excel)
- Bundling of programs (e.g. MS Office)
- Bundling of people (e.g. MS Office site licenses)
- Pure and Mixed Bundling
- Pure: only sell bundle.
- Mixed: see bundle and components separately.


## Bundling and Price Discrimination

- Bundling can reduce the dispersion of consumers' WTP.
- Ann and Bob have values for Excel and Word

|  | Excel | Word |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Ann (accountant) | 100 | 60 |
| Bob (bureaucrat) | 60 | 100 |

- If sell separately
- Prices: \$60 for Word, \$60 for Excel.
- Profits \$240.
- If sell as bundle
- Prices: \$160 for bundle.
- Profits:\$320.


## Bundling and Price Discrimination

- Bundling can reduce the dispersion of consumers' WTP.
- This is easy to see when there are many goods
- 1000 customers and 10 songs.
- Each customers' value per song is uniformly distributed on [0,I]




## Other Reasons to Bundle

- Complimentary consumption (e.g. shoes)
- Complimentary production (e.g. CDs)
- Reduce the number of payments (e.g. newspaper articles)
- Blocking entry (e.g. Microsoft)


## Price Complexity

## - Airline Pricing

- Airline prices used to be very complex: price depends on whether single/return, on how match flights etc.
- Increasingly sell single tickets (e.g. Virgin America)
- Complex prices
- May be optimal form of price discrimination
- Makes price comparison hard, and softens competition
- But...
- Confuses customers
* People may think differential pricing is unfair


## Framing

- Customers stick with default options (endowment effect)
- Put object "in hands" of customer.
- Don't overwhelm consumers (choice overload)
- People more likely to buy nothing.
- Product positioning (reference effects, anchoring)
- Choose middle option
- Choose second cheapest (or second most expensive) wine
- Search by brand then price (affects how recommend)
- Mental accounting
- People subdivide expenditures (e.g. insurance on computer).


## Beyond Prices

## Zero Prices

- Zero prices are commonplace (but not universal)
- Email accounts, Internet hotspots, Online newspapers
- How earn money?
- Advertising (e.g. gmail)
, Selling complementary goods (e.g. support with Sun's MySQL)
- Advantages of zero price (over small prices)
- No transactions costs (billing, usernames, passwords)
> Create environment of experimentation
- Maintain privacy
- Problems
, Overconsumption if MCキ0 (e.g. data plans, email spam)
- Hoarding (e.g. IP addresses)


## Online Advertising



## Motives for Advertising

- Informative (e.g. restaurants)
- Inform customers of products existence
- Advertise specific features or price
- Signal quality through commitment to product
- Persuasive (e.g. branded drugs)
- Change customer's view of product
- Jam their memory, so first think of your product.
- Importance of advertising depends on type of good
- Search good - inform of existence, jam memory of customer
- Experience good - persuade customer quality will be high


## Intensity of Advertising

- The intensity of advertising varies a lot across industries
- Breakfast cereals - advertising is $10 \%$ of revenue
- Salt - advertising is essentially $0 \%$ of revenue
- Amount of advertising depends on
- The sensitivity of demand to advertising
- The markup
- The efficiency of advertising
- Whether advertising helps your firm, or helps all firm.
- The sensitivity depends on
> The amount of product differentiation
- Search vs. experience good
- Market concentration


## Advertising Strategy

- Single firm
- Suppose advertising shifts the demand curve.
- Care about the WTP of the marginal customer.
- Analogous to vertical differentiation.
- Like quality, advertising is also investment in brand equity.
- What if there are many firms?
- Advertising about features can soften price competition
b Consumers realize products differentiated.
, Spurious product differentiation (e.g. Nutrasweet vs. generics)
- Advertising about prices can increase price competition
- If prices known, firms can cut price to get more customers.


## Online Advertising

- Advantages of online advertising
- Highly targeted (IP, time, registration info, previous pages, GPS)
- Low fixed cost
- Major types of ad
- Display ads - visual appeal, branding
- Search ads - very contextually specific
- Text ads - specific, unobtrusive
- Mobile ads - time and location sensitive
- Methods of payment
- Pay per view
- Pay per click

Share of advertising coming from this format

| Advertising format | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Display related | 78\% | 72\% | 60\% | 42\% | 39\% | 34\% | 32\% | 34\% | 33\% |
| Banners | 48\% | $36 \%$ | 29\% | 21\% | 19\% | 20\% | 22\% | 21\% | 21\% |
| Sponsorships | 28\% | 26\% | 18\% | 10\% | 8\% | 5\% | 3\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Rich media | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | 5\% | 8\% | 10\% | 8\% | 7\% | 8\% | 7\% |
| Slotting fees | 0\% | 8\% | 8\% | 3\% | 2\% | 1\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Digital video | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 2\% | $3 \%$ |
| Search | 1\% | 4\% | 15\% | 35\% | 40\% | 41\% | 40\% | 41\% | 45\% |
| Classifieds | 7\% | 16\% | 15\% | 17\% | 18\% | 17\% | 18\% | 16\% | 14\% |
| Lead generation | 4\% | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% | 2\% | 6\% | 8\% | 7\% | 7\% |
| E-mail | 3\% | 3\% | 4\% | 3\% | 1\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Interstitials | 4\% | 3\% | 5\% | 2\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Other | 3\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Total (million \$) | 8,087 | 7,134 | 6,010 | 7,267 | 9,626 | 12,542 | 16,879 | 21,206 | 23,400 |

Ad Formats Definitions: Display ads on websites look like those in newspapers and magazines. A banner is a space (usually rectangular) on a web page that shows the advertiser's message; this category includes all display ads except for the other specialized categories listed below it. Sponsorships represent custom content and/or experiences created for an advertiser that may or may not include ad elements (for example, reskinning a section of a website with the advertiser's branding). Rich media refers to advertisements that incorporate animation, sound, and/or interactivity in any format. Slotting fees are the fee charged for premium ad placement and/or exclusivity. Digital video format includes commercials that appear in live, archived, and downloadable streaming content. Search refers to paying Internet companies to present an advertisement linked to a specific search word or phrase. It includes paid listings (text links appear at the top or side of search results for specific keywords); contextual search (text links appear in an article based on the context of the content rather than on the basis of a user-submitted keyword); and paid inclusion (guarantees that a marketer's URL is indexed by a search engine). Although this data source includes "contextual advertisements" in the search category, these ads are targeted display ads that are not based on the use of a search engine and are treated as part of display ads in the remainder of this paper. Contextual advertisements accounted for about 8 percent advertising revenue in 2008. "Classifieds" refer to the posting of a product or service in an online listing for a fee. "Lead generation" indicates referrals to qualified purchase inquiries. E-mail ads include banner ads, links, or advertiser sponsorships that appear in commercial e-mail communication. Interstitials are ads displayed during a transition from one Web page to the next.

## Industry Structure

## - Advertising on search site

- Second price auction for adwords
- Bids ranked, and slots allocated with highest first
- Pay per click
- Price depends on word (\$99 for mesothelioma; typically \$0.4)
- Advertising on other websites
- Pay per view for display
- Media site: \$12 per 1000 impressions
- Social networks historically lower: $\$ 0.5$ per 1000 impressions
- Large firms find own advertisers for display.
, Otherwise use advertising network (e.g. Doubleclick)


## Market Structure



