The Economics of E-commerce and Technology

Reputation

Reputation

- Reputations are essential with experience goods
 - Where experience good after buying
- Reputation performs two functions
 - Allow people to learn about quality of product
 - Discipline bad behavior
- Offline
 - Long term relations, word-of-mouth, legal system
- Online reputation mechanisms
 - ▶ eBay buyers and sellers rate each other
 - Yelp − customers review restaurants
 - Peer-to-peer networks rate user's contribution to system

Reputation Mechanisms

Information technology allows for precise management

- What type of information is solicited?
- When should it be solicited?
- How is information aggregated?
- What information is made available, and to whom?

Examples


- Detailed information (surveys) vs. positive/negative?
- How filter out suspect reviews? Weight by trustworthiness?
- Provide recent reviews or entire history? (eBay vs. Yelp)

Challenges

- Encourage participation
- Extract accurate, useful information
- Avoid strategic manipulation

eBay

Typical eBay page



Learn more

Reputation and eBay

- eBay has first-mover advantage
 - Does not guarantee success: Altavista, WordPerfect
 - Reputation system is key part of success
- Reputation system protects buyers
 - Is good delivered promptly?
 - Is good as described?
 - Outright fraud?
- System creates switching costs for reputable sellers
- More important as eBay increases high-values sales
 - Art, cars, houses, land

How Valuable is Seller Reputation?

Reputation is useful [for postcards]

- Having 2000 positive feedbacks and I negative yields 8% higher prices that having I0 positive feedbacks
- When have little feedback, negatives make little difference.Reflects cheapness of online profiles.

After receive first negative feedback

- Weekly sales rates goes from +7% to -7%
- Subsequent negative feedback arrives 25% more rapidly

Seller exit

- Exit more likely when reputation is low
- Just before exit, sellers receive lots of negative feedback

How Valuable is Seller Reputation?

- lt's also valuable to be a "powerseller" or a "store".
- Saeedi (2012), looks at iPod prices:

	Average Prices		Fitted Values	
	All iPods	New iPod Nano	Average Item	New, Nano, 8GB
All Sellers	\$131.81	\$132.95	\$136.51	\$135.34
Non-Powersellers & Non-Store	\$130.70	\$130.15	\$122.18	\$131.19
Stores	\$135.96	\$134.09	\$128.80	\$139.96
Powersellers	\$134.95	\$137.44	\$137.79	\$140.90
Powersellers & Stores	\$139.90	\$135.29	\$145.35	\$142.09

Does Reputation Work?

Baseball card market on Ebay

▶ Graded card: Ken Griffey Jr worth \$1200 for 10, \$150 for 9, \$60 for 8.

Graded market


Reputation of seller doesn't matter.

Ungraded market

- ▶ Higher claims lead to higher prices: \$90 for 10, \$70 for 9, \$50 for others.
- I0 claim not credible: should get card graded
- When tested, quality independent of claims.
- High claims had higher frauds (hit and run strategy).
- Buyers and sellers of 10's less experienced

Role of eBay reputation

- High reputation less likely to claim "10"
- Raises probability of sale, but not prices
- Fixing claim, reputation has no effect on quality, lowers prob of fraud




Mutually positive feedback (N=451,227)

Only buyer left bad feedback (N=2,884)

Mutually bad feedback (N=5,279)

Only seller left bad feedback (N=357)



Problems with Ebay Reputation

Feedback not sufficiently rich

- Feedback often concerns time to delivery, not quality of card
- Detailed review expires after 90 days

2. Easy to build up reputation

- Market for feedback: buy "positive feedback book" \$0.25
- Build up as buyer, then become seller

Feedback is bilateral

Buyers fear retaliation from sellers

4. Reputation could be more informative

- Weight by value of transaction
- Weight by experience of buyer
- Weight by recentness

Theory

Reputation and Learning

- Reputation provides information about underlying quality
 - Helps solve "adverse selection"
 - ▶ Epinions, Amazon's reviews
- Example: Product is 'high' or 'low' quality with equal prob
 - ▶ High product yields v=10 with prob $\frac{3}{4}$, and v=0 with prob $\frac{1}{4}$
 - Low product yields v=10 with prob $\frac{1}{4}$, and v=0 with prob $\frac{3}{4}$
- First customer
 - Willing to pay: Pr(high)U(high) + Pr(low)U(low) = \$5
- Second customer (if first liked product)
 - ▶ Bayes rule: $Pr[high|v_1=10] = \frac{3}{4}$
 - Willing to pay: $Pr(high)U(high) + Pr(low)U(low) = $6\frac{1}{4}$
 - What if first did not like the product?

Reputation and Discipline

- Reputation punishes bad behavior ("moral hazard")
 - Helps overcome eBay rating, restaurant hygiene
- Firm chooses high effort (cost c_H) or low effort (c_L)
 - ▶ Benefit to customers: $v_H > v_I$. But agent does not see effort.
 - Firm then chooses price to charge agent.
 - Assume high effort is socially optimal: $v_H c_H > v_L c_L$
- What happens in one-shot game?
- \blacktriangleright Repeated game with discount rate δ
 - Suppose customers use "grim trigger" punishment: Pay up to v_H if never cheated; only pay v_L if ever cheated before
- High effort sustainable if firm patient (i.e. δ high):

$$\frac{1}{1-\delta}(v_H - c_H) \ge (v_H - c_L) + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta}(v_L - c_L)$$

Punishment schemes

- Is punishment severe enough to deter defection?
- Is punishment credible? Subgame perfect? Renegotiation proof?
 - Is punishment optimal after defection?
 - Credible not to renegotiate?
- When to punish?
 - Is deviation deliberate or by mistake?
- How do you recover from mistakes?

Cooperation harder to enforce when:

- Harder to detect defection (e.g. more randomness)
- Longer to detect defection (e.g. time to review)
- Harder to coordinate punishment (e.g. diffuse community)
- ▶ Higher benefits from defection (e.g. high value goods)
- Demand high (e.g. selling Wii's before Christmas)
- Firm is less patient (e.g. firm is failing)
- Re-entry is easy
- Ambiguity about what is acceptable behavior


Eliciting Feedback



Coming Soon

In theaters December 14.

Get Showtimes Watch Trailer »



The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012)



Adventure | Fantasy - 14 December 2012 (USA)



Your rating: ********* -/10

Ratings: 9.3/10 from 4,437 users

Reviews: write review

A curious Hobbit, Bilbo Baggins, journeys to the Lonely Mountain with a vigorous group of Dwarves to reclaim a treasure stolen from them by the dragon Smaug.

Director: Peter Jackson

Writers: Fran Walsh (screenplay), Philippa Boyens

(screenplay), and 3 more credits »

Stars: Martin Freeman, Ian McKellen and Richard Armitage

See full cast and crew

Designing Reputation Mechanisms

- What type of information should be solicited?
 - Positive/negative (Rotten Tomatoes), ratings out of 5 (Yelp), detailed surveys (eBay), freeform (Yelp)
- How encourage participation
 - Pay for feedback (Angie's List), prestige (Yelp), Matching (Netflix)
- How obtain high quality reviews?
 - ▶ Review the review (Yelp), or review the reviewer (Amazon).
- How prevent strategic manipulation?
 - Cross-check reviews, Use robust statistics
- ▶ How is information aggregated?
 - Weight more recent higher? Weight reviews by rating?
- Punishing bad behavior
 - Make re-entry harder, reduce time until reviews posted

The Trust Business

The Trust Business

For many firms their reputation is most important asset

- Financial firms (banks, life insurance, market makers)
- Experience goods (Intel, Odwalla, Toyota)

Banks

- Banks invest money in long-term projects (e.g. mortgages)
- If people believe bank will fail, this causes bank run
- Failure becomes self-fulfilling

Intel

- In 1994 covered up Pentium bug
- Refused to replace when discovered

Odwalla

- E. coli outbreak in 1996, led 66 people to become sick
- Recall cost \$6.5m (revenue \$59m) and started to pasteurize

Enron

Market cap of \$60bn at end of 2000

- Hid \$8bn of debts and went bankrupt by end of 2001
- Why aren't profitable parts of Enron still in business?

Enron's Business

- Long-term contracts for natural gas (and chemicals, metal etc)
- Enron acted as middleman party to every transaction
- Every trader has credit exposure to Enron

What happened?

- At start of scandal Enron started to look shaky
- Bid-Ask spread widened because of credit risk
- Enron's profits fell, further increasing credit risk

Lesson: loss of trust cannot be contained

It can spill into all aspects of firm's operations