

The Economics of E-commerce and Technology

Dynamic Pricing

Peak Load Pricing

- ▶ Suppose a firm has zero marginal cost, with capacity K
 - ▶ Broadband capacity, cell phone towers, hotel rooms
 - ▶ Capacity costs z per unit to build.
- ▶ There are two periods (or two equally likely states)
 - ▶ Period L demand is low, $p_L(q)$
 - ▶ Period H demand is high, $p_H(q)$
- ▶ Firm chooses q_L , q_H and K to maximize profits
$$\pi = q_L p_L(q_L) + q_H p_H(q_H) - zK \quad \text{subject to } q_L, q_H \leq K$$
- ▶ Lagrangian: choose q_L , q_H and K to maximize
$$L = q_L p_L(q_L) + q_H p_H(q_H) - zK + \lambda_L [K - q_L] + \lambda_H [K - q_H]$$

Peak Load Pricing

▶ Solution

- ▶ FOCs for q_L, q_H and K : $MR_L(q_L^*) = \lambda_L$, $MR_H(q_H^*) = \lambda_H$, $z = \lambda_L + \lambda_H$
- ▶ Optimal capacity: $K^* = q_H^*$

▶ Idea: Charge capacity when constraint binds.

▶ Two cases:

1. Constraint slack in period L (big difference in demands)
2. Constraint binds in period L (small difference in demands)


▶ Price in H higher for two reasons

- (a) The demand is higher,
- (b) Charging more of the capacity

▶ Examples: cheap evening calls and Christmas flights


1. Constraint Slack in Period L ($q_L^* < q_H^*$)

- ▶ Optimal quantities: $MR_L(q_L^*)=0$, $MR_H(q_H^*)=z$



2. Constraint Binds in Period L ($q_L^* < q_H^*$)

- ▶ Optimal quantities: $q_L^* = q_H^*$, $MR_L(q_L^*) = \lambda_L$, $MR_H(q_H^*) = z - \lambda_L$



Revenue Management

- ▶ A firm has K tickets to sell
 - ▶ Airline seats, hotel rooms, advertising slots
- ▶ Customers arrive over time
 - ▶ Customers have value v unknown to firm
- ▶ How should firm set prices over time? If lower price:
 - (a) sell to marginal agents today
 - (b) make less revenue from inframarginal agents
 - (c) lose opportunity to sell tomorrow

Revenue Management: Example

- ▶ **Example: one item to sell ($K=1$)**
 - ▶ There are N customers with $v \sim U[0,1]$
- ▶ **Last customer**
 - ▶ Choose p_N to maximize $\Pi_N = (\text{prob sell}) \times \text{price} = (1-p_N)p_N$.
 - ▶ Solution: $p_N^* = 0.5$, yielding $\Pi_N^* = 0.25$.
- ▶ **Dynamic programming: suppose n^{th} customer arrives**
 - ▶ Choose p_n to maximize $\Pi_n = (1-p_n)p_n + p_n\Pi_{n+1}$.
 - ▶ Solution: $p_n^* = 0.5[1 + \Pi_{n+1}]$, yielding $\Pi_n^* = 0.25[1 + \Pi_{n+1}]^2$
- ▶ **Working backwards with 5 customers:**

	5 th	4 th	3 rd	2 nd	1 st
Price, p_n^*	0.5	0.63	0.70	0.74	0.78
Profit, Π_n^*	0.25	0.39	0.48	0.55	0.60

Durable Goods and Price Commitment

- ▶ **Apple is thinking how to price the iPhone**
 - ▶ In the first year it sells to high value customers
 - ▶ Then lowers price to sell to low value customers
- ▶ **Problem: Customers anticipate price will fall**
 - ▶ Customer delay purchases until price falls
 - ▶ Monopolist competes with future selves
- ▶ **Model applies to durable goods**
 - ▶ Software, Xbox, Art
- ▶ **Model applies to durable services**
 - ▶ Movies, information goods.

Durable Goods: Example

- ▶ N customers have $v=30$, N customers have $v=10$.
- ▶ Suppose there are two periods, with discount rate δ
 - ▶ If commit to one price, charge $p=30$, profit $\Pi = 30N$.
- ▶ Suppose sell to high agents in period 1
 - ▶ Charge $p_2=10$ and sell to low agents in period 2.
- ▶ High agents anticipate price will fall and may wait
 - ▶ Charge at most $p_1=30-20\delta$, for high agents to buy in period 1
 - ▶ Total profits $\Pi = (30-20\delta)N + \delta(10)N = (30-10\delta)N$
- ▶ Firm suffers because it cannot commit
 - ▶ Firm cannot resist lowering price in period 2, exerting a negative externality on its former self.

Durable Goods: Solutions

- ▶ **Solution 1: Destroy the mould (e.g. artist)**
 - ▶ Without mould cannot create quantity in second period
- ▶ **Solution 2: Reputation (e.g. Xbox games)**
 - ▶ Develop reputation for not dropping prices
- ▶ **Solution 3: Renting (e.g. Xerox)**
 - ▶ Good no longer “durable”, so sell static monopoly quantity each period
- ▶ **Solution 4: Best-price provision (e.g. iPhone)**
 - ▶ If firm lowers price then customers get rebate
 - ▶ Firm never any incentive to lower price below monopoly price since lose money in rebates

Behavior Based Pricing and Commitment

- ▶ Suppose a firm sells to customers multiple times
- ▶ Purchasing behavior in early period tells firm about values
 - ▶ Firm tempted to condition price on past behavior
- ▶ **Problem: Customers anticipate “ratchet effect”**
 - ▶ Customers delay purchases to get lower prices later
 - ▶ Monopolist competes with her future selves
- ▶ **Applications**
 - ▶ Online sites with cookies, magazine subscriptions, cable TV

Behavior Based Pricing: Example

- ▶ N customers have $v=30$, N customers have $v=10$.
- ▶ Suppose there are two periods, with discount rate δ
 - ▶ If cannot see past behavior, charge $p=30$, profit $\Pi_0 = 30(1+\delta)N$.
- ▶ Suppose sell to high agents in period 1
 - ▶ Charge $p_2=10$ if did not buy in period 1
 - ▶ Charge $p_2=30$ if bought in period 1 (ratchet effect)
- ▶ If customers myopic charge $p_1=30$
 - ▶ Total profits $\Pi_M = 30N + \delta(30+10)N = (30+40\delta)N > \Pi_0$
- ▶ If customers forward looking, anticipate price fall if don't buy
 - ▶ Charge at most $p_1=30-20\delta$, for high agents to buy in period 1
 - ▶ Total profits $\Pi_F = (30-20\delta)N + \delta(30+10)N = (30+20\delta)N < \Pi_0$
- ▶ Firm suffers because it cannot commit
 - ▶ Firm cannot resist lowering price in period 2, exerting a negative externality on its former self.

Why are there Introductory Discounts?

- ▶ **Behavioral-based pricing view**
 - ▶ Firms can't resist giving discount to people who don't purchase
 - ▶ These discounts hurt the firm if
 - (a) Consumers are forward looking
 - (b) Consumers get annoyed
- ▶ **Introductory discounts may be good idea**
 - ▶ Network effects (see network slides)
 - ▶ Overcome switching costs (see lockin slides)
 - ▶ Encourage customer experimentation (next slide)

Customer Experimentation

- ▶ Product is “experience good”
 - ▶ Don’t know taste until tried it
- ▶ Customers have value $v=30$ or $v=10$ with equal prob.
 - ▶ Optimal pricing: niche market strategy
 - ▶ Period 1, charge price $p_1=20$, and everyone buys
 - ▶ Period $t \geq 2$, charge price $p_t=30$, and high value agents buy
- ▶ Customers have value $v=30$ or $v=20$ with equal prob.
 - ▶ Optimal pricing: mass market strategy
 - ▶ Period 1, charge price $p_1=25$, and everyone buys
 - ▶ Period $t \geq 2$, charge price $p_t=20$, and everyone buy

Firm Experimentation

- ▶ **How does a firm price when it does not know demand?**
 - ▶ Firm wishes to sell a unique good.
 - ▶ Customers enter each period (not forward looking)
 - ▶ Each buyer has the same value, v , unknown to firm
- ▶ **Optimal policy: start price high and lower slowly.**
 - ▶ Solve through backwards induction.
 - ▶ Rate of decrease depends on firm's patience.
- ▶ **What if have good each period to sell?**
 - ▶ Price may go up or down.
 - ▶ But should move prices around to experiment.
- ▶ **Experimentation very easy online**
 - ▶ Run A/B tests. Seems scientific, but can be misleading.

Sticky Prices

- ▶ For single firm, choose price so $d\pi(p^*)/dp=0$.
- ▶ Suppose there is inflation and cost k of changing prices
 - ▶ E.g. Physical cost of printing menu
- ▶ No reason to change price when almost optimal.
 - ▶ Costs k , but only second order gain.
- ▶ Optimal policy is called (S,s) rule.
 - ▶ When real price hits $p_L < p^*$ then increase to $p_H > p^*$.
- ▶ Similar story when demand subject to shocks.
 - ▶ If demand has transitory increase, bring
 - ▶ If demand has permanent increase, also increase S .