# The Economics of E-commerce and Technology 

Monetization: Prices and Advertising

## The Stages of Buying (The Marketing Funnel)



## Basic Monopoly Pricing

## Monopoly Pricing: Recap

- Constant marginal cost, c.
- Firm chooses quantity to maximize profits

$$
\Pi(q)=q(p(q)-c)
$$

- First-order condition

$$
M R(q)=c
$$

- Inverse elasticity rule

$$
\frac{p-c}{p}=\frac{1}{e} \quad \text { where } \quad e=-\frac{p}{q} \frac{d q}{d p}
$$

## Multi-product monopolist

- Microsoft sells XBox and Halo
* If sell separately optimal prices $\mathrm{Px}_{\mathrm{X}}=300, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{H}}=50$.
- But they sell both: how should they price them?
- Walmart sells Xbox and PS3
- If sell separately optimal prices $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{x}}=300, \mathrm{p}_{\text {PS }}=400$.
- But they sell both: how should they price?
- Economist sells print and online editions
- How should they price?


## Multi-product monopolist

- Firm chooses $\left(\mathrm{q}_{1}, \mathrm{q}_{2}\right)$ to maximize

$$
\Pi\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)=q_{1}\left(p_{1}\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)-c_{1}\right)+q_{2}\left(p_{2}\left(q_{1}, q_{2}\right)-c_{2}\right)
$$

- Inverse elasticity rule for $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{I}}$

$$
\frac{p_{1}-c_{1}}{p_{1}}=\frac{1}{e_{11}}-\frac{\left(p_{2}-c_{2}\right) q_{2}}{p_{1} q_{1} e_{11}} e_{12} \text { where } e_{12}=-\frac{p_{1}}{q_{2}} \frac{d q_{2}}{d p_{1}}
$$

- Substitutes: $\mathrm{e}_{12}<0$
- Negative externality so increase $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{I}}$.
- Complements: $\mathrm{e}_{12}>0$
- Positive externality so reduce $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{I}}$.


## New Products and Cannibalization

- When launching new product, do cost-benefit analysis.
- But products are often complements/substitutes for old:
- Netflix launches Video on Demand
- Apple launches iPad
- Amazon launches Kindle
- Relation matters:
- If compliment then introduce product earlier
- If substitute then delay because of cannibalization
- This relates to last slide:
- Having a product unavailable is like price being infinity.
- Need to take externalities into account when launching.


## Price Discrimination

## Three types of price discrimination

First-degree
Perfect price discrimination.
Shows power of nonlinear pricing.
Third-degree (group pricing)
Price as function of observables.
Examples: Student status, zip code, assets.
3. Second-degree (indirect price discrimination)

Offer menu of options and let people self-select.
Examples:Versioning, quantity discounts.
Pricing often has all three elements: nonlinear pricing, group pricing and versioning.

## First-Degree Price Discrimination

- Suppose know customer's demand curve, p(q).
- Firm can extract all consumer surplus
, Let welfare maximizing quantity be $\mathrm{q}^{*}$, so that $\mathrm{p}\left(\mathrm{q}^{*}\right)=\mathrm{c}$.
- Three ways to extract

।. Block pricing: sell $\mathrm{q}^{*}$ units at $\mathrm{W}\left(\mathrm{q}^{*}\right)=\int_{0} \mathrm{q}^{*} \mathrm{p}(\mathrm{q}) \mathrm{dq}$
2. Two-part tariff: price $p=c$ and fee $C S\left(q^{*}\right)=W\left(q^{*}\right)=\int_{0} \mathrm{a}^{*}[p(q)-c] d q$
3. Nonlinear prices: Sell $q^{\text {th }}$ unit for price $p(q)$.

- Big assumptions
- Know customers demand.
- Can charge different prices to different customers.
- Example: Elsevier and Universities


## Third-Degree Price Discrimination

- Firm can observe customer characteristics
b Country (e.g. book prices)
b Student status (e.g. airline tickets)
- Optimal pricing: Use inverse elasticity rule for each group.
- Lower price to most sensitive groups.
- Assumptions
- No resale (e.g. international editions of textbooks)
- No cost to setting different prices
- Cannot change characteristics (e.g. hide student card)
- No ethical issues (e.g. racial discrimination in car sales)
- Consumer demand and observable characteristics are correlated
- Has internet made easier or harder?


## Second-Degree Price Discrimination

- Offer menu of products and see which consumers choose
- High and low quality products (vertical differentiation).
- Indian and American textbook (horizontal differentiation).
, Quantity discounts.
- Big idea
- Choose options so different types of customers self-select.
- Want to separate groups that have different WTP.
, Need customers with different WTP to value features differently
- Classic example: Coupons (or Groupons)
- Put coupons in the newspaper.
- Annoying to cut out and bring to store.
- How does this raise profits? Why not just lower price?


## A Classic Example

It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches. [...] What the company is trying to do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich.

Jules Dupuit, I849

## A Modern Example



## Smarter Travel Search Better Travel Deals <br> Search for places or experiences, discover more affordable destinations, save up to $40 \%$ off your next trip



See how GetGoing can save you big on your next trip

## How to Price Discriminate

- Theory beautiful but intricate.
- See notes on website.
- How to approach problem in general
- Suppose utility is $u=v x-p$, with $v \in\left\{v_{\mathrm{L}}, v_{\mathrm{H}}\right\}$
b Consider selling bundles to each type, $\left(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{L}}, \mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{L}}\right)$ and $\left(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{H}}, \mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{H}}\right)$
- Agents must choose their own bundle (incentive compatibility)
- In optimum
- High type will be indifferent between high- and low-bundle.
- Low type will be indifferent between low-bundle and no bundle.
- High quality is efficient; low quality is degraded.


## Naïve Price Discrimination

- What if we just ignored other goods?
- Example: Utility $u=v x-p, v \sim U[0, I]$ and $x \in\left\{x_{L}, x_{H}\right\}$.
- Naïve pricing: $P_{L}=1 / 2\left(x_{L}+c_{L}\right)$ and $P_{H}=1 / 2\left(x_{H}+c_{H}\right)$
- What are optimal prices?
- Demand for each good:

$$
q_{H}=1-\frac{p_{H}-p_{L}}{x_{H}-x_{L}} \quad \text { and } \quad q_{L}=\frac{p_{H}-p_{L}}{x_{H}-x_{L}}-\frac{p_{L}}{x_{L}}
$$

b Firm's profits: $\pi=q_{L}\left(P_{L}-c_{L}\right)+q_{H}\left(P_{H}-c_{H}\right)$.

- Differentiating w.r.t. ( $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{L}}, \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{H}}$ ), the naïve prices are optimal!
- Generally, need hazard rate of demand to be affine.


## Practical Issues of Versioning

- How many versions?
, Want to cleanly separate consumers (e.g. business vs. leisure)
- Cost to maintaining different product lines (e.g. airlines)
- Customer confusion from too many options (e.g. cinemas)
- Different options may reduce network effects. (e.g. wordpad)
- Degraded versions
- Need to ensure customers cannot undo (e.g. unlock software).
- Use degraded version to promote regular one (e.g. mathematica)
- Framing
- People like "middle" option.


## (Non)linear Pricing in Supply Chains

- Example (the cable business)
- HBO sells input to TW; TW sells output to customers.
b Market demand is $q=100-\mathrm{p}$. Both firms have zero costs.
- Maximal Industry Profits
- Charge $p=50$, sell quantity $q=50$. Profits $=50 * 50=2500$.
- What if HBO charges transfer price $t$ ?
b Then TW maximizes $\pi_{\mathrm{TW}}=(\mathrm{p}-\mathrm{t})(100-\mathrm{p})$
- Chooses $p=50+t / 2$ and sells $q=50-t / 2$, treating ' t ' as input cost.
- What input price does HBO choose?
- HBO maximizes $\pi_{\text {НВо }}=\mathrm{t}(50-\mathrm{t} / 2)$, implying $\mathrm{t}=50, \mathrm{q}=25$ and $\mathrm{p}=75$.
- Firms charge more than monopoly price!
- Intuitively, each firm exert negative externality on the other.
- Can raise profits by merging or using two-part-tariff


## Other Aspects of Pricing

## Bundling

- Bundling is very common
- Bundling of functions (e.g. Excel)
- Bundling of programs (e.g. MS Office)
- Bundling of people (e.g. MS Office site licenses)
- Pure and Mixed Bundling
- Pure: only sell bundle.
- Mixed: see bundle and components separately.


## Bundling and Price Discrimination

- Bundling can reduce the dispersion of consumers' WTP.
- Ann and Bob have values for Excel and Word

|  | Excel | Word |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Ann (accountant) | 100 | 60 |
| Bob (bureaucrat) | 60 | 100 |

- If sell separately
- Prices: \$60 for Word, \$60 for Excel.
- Profits \$240.
- If sell as bundle
- Prices: \$160 for bundle.
- Profits:\$320.


Now 47: That's What I Call Music
Now That's What I Call Music (Artist) | Format: Audio CD

Price: $\$ 11.88$ \& FREE Shipping on orders over $\$ 25$. Details
AutoRip > : Includes FREE MP3 version of this album.
Provided by Amazon Digital Services, Inc. Terms and Conditions. Does not appl orders.

## In Stock.

Ships from and sold by Amazon.com. Gift-wrap available
Want it Monday, Sept. 23? Order within 20 hrs 27 mins and choose One-Day Shipping Details
Complete your purchase to save the MP3 version to Cloud Player.
35 new from $\$ 8.58 \quad 2$ used from $\$ 11.16$
share $\square_{\text {f }}$ P
Roll over image to zoom in

| Formats | Amazon Price | New from | Used from |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| MP3 Music, 20 Songs, 2013 | $\$ 9.49$ | $\$ 9.49$ | - |
| Audio CD, 2013 | $\$ 11.88$ | $\$ 8.58$ | $\$ 11.16$ |

Listen to Samples and Buy MP3s View the MP3 Album.
Listen to all [圆 Try our music sampler to hear song samples from this album.


## Bundling and Price Discrimination

- Bundling can reduce the dispersion of consumers' WTP.
- This is easy to see when there are many goods
b 1000 customers and 10 songs.
- Each customers' value per song is uniformly distributed on [0,I]




## Other Reasons to Bundle

- Complimentary consumption (e.g. shoes)
- Complimentary production (e.g. CDs)
- Reduce the number of payments (e.g. newspaper articles)
- Blocking entry (e.g. Microsoft)


## Price Complexity

- Airline Pricing
- Airline prices used to be very complex: price depends on whether single/return, on how match flights etc.
- Increasingly sell single tickets (e.g. Virgin America)
- Complex prices
- May be optimal form of price discrimination
- Makes price comparison hard, and softens competition
- But...
- Confuses customers
- People may think differential pricing is unfair


## Framing

- Anchoring
- People overweight first piece of information
- Status quo bias
- Endowment effect
- Prospect theory
- Context effects
, Choose middle option (compromise effect)
- Choices affected by dominated alternatives (attraction effect)
- Mental accounting
- People subdivide expenditures (e.g. insurance on computer).
- Don't overwhelm consumers (choice overload)
- People more likely to buy nothing.


## Zero Prices

- Zero prices are commonplace.
- Email accounts, Internet hotspots, Online newspapers
- How earn money?
- Advertising (e.g. gmail)
, Selling complementary goods (e.g. support with Sun's MySQL)
- Advantages of zero price (over small prices)
- Avoid customers thinking about whether to use product.
- No transactions costs (billing, usernames, passwords)
b Create environment of experimentation
- Maintain privacy
- Problems
- Overconsumption if MCキ0 (e.g. data plans, email spam)
- Hoarding (e.g. IP addresses)


## Advertising

Facts

## Online Advertising



## Online Advertising

- Advantages of online advertising
- Highly targeted (IP, time, registration info, previous pages, GPS)
- Low fixed cost
- Major types of ad
- Display ads - visual appeal, branding
- Search ads - very contextually specific
- Text ads - specific, unobtrusive
- Mobile ads - time and location sensitive
- Earned media/Publicity
- Celebrity endorsements, press releases
- Social media
- Online word of mouth

Share of advertising coming from this format

| Advertising format | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Display related | 78\% | 72\% | 60\% | 42\% | 39\% | 34\% | 32\% | 34\% | 33\% |
| Banners | 48\% | $36 \%$ | 29\% | 21\% | 19\% | 20\% | 22\% | 21\% | 21\% |
| Sponsorships | 28\% | 26\% | 18\% | 10\% | 8\% | 5\% | 3\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| Rich media | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ | 5\% | 8\% | 10\% | 8\% | 7\% | 8\% | 7\% |
| Slotting fees | 0\% | 8\% | 8\% | 3\% | 2\% | 1\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Digital video | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 2\% | $3 \%$ |
| Search | 1\% | 4\% | 15\% | 35\% | 40\% | 41\% | 40\% | 41\% | 45\% |
| Classifieds | 7\% | 16\% | 15\% | 17\% | 18\% | 17\% | 18\% | 16\% | 14\% |
| Lead generation | 4\% | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% | 2\% | 6\% | 8\% | 7\% | 7\% |
| E-mail | 3\% | 3\% | 4\% | 3\% | 1\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 2\% |
| Interstitials | 4\% | 3\% | 5\% | 2\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Other | 3\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Total (million \$) | 8,087 | 7,134 | 6,010 | 7,267 | 9,626 | 12,542 | 16,879 | 21,206 | 23,400 |

Ad Formats Definitions: Display ads on websites look like those in newspapers and magazines. A banner is a space (usually rectangular) on a web page that shows the advertiser's message; this category includes all display ads except for the other specialized categories listed below it. Sponsorships represent custom content and/or experiences created for an advertiser that may or may not include ad elements (for example, reskinning a section of a website with the advertiser's branding). Rich media refers to advertisements that incorporate animation, sound, and/or interactivity in any format. Slotting fees are the fee charged for premium ad placement and/or exclusivity. Digital video format includes commercials that appear in live, archived, and downloadable streaming content. Search refers to paying Internet companies to present an advertisement linked to a specific search word or phrase. It includes paid listings (text links appear at the top or side of search results for specific keywords); contextual search (text links appear in an article based on the context of the content rather than on the basis of a user-submitted keyword); and paid inclusion (guarantees that a marketer's URL is indexed by a search engine). Although this data source includes "contextual advertisements" in the search category, these ads are targeted display ads that are not based on the use of a search engine and are treated as part of display ads in the remainder of this paper. Contextual advertisements accounted for about 8 percent advertising revenue in 2008. "Classifieds" refer to the posting of a product or service in an online listing for a fee. "Lead generation" indicates referrals to qualified purchase inquiries. E-mail ads include banner ads, links, or advertiser sponsorships that appear in commercial e-mail communication. Interstitials are ads displayed during a transition from one Web page to the next.

## Examples of online ads

- Advertising on search site
- Second price auction for adwords
- Bids ranked, and slots allocated with highest first
- Pay per click
- Price depends on word (\$99 for mesothelioma; typically \$0.4)
- Advertising on other websites
- Pay per view for display
- Media site: \$12 per 1000 impressions
, Social networks historically lower: $\$ 0.5$ per 1000 impressions
- Large firms find own advertisers for display.
- Otherwise use advertising network (e.g. Doubleclick)


## Market Structure



## Advertising

Theory

## Motives for Advertising

- Informative (e.g. restaurants)
- Inform customers of products existence
- Advertise specific features or price
- Signal quality through commitment to product
- Persuasive (e.g. branded drugs)
, Change customer's view of product
> Jam their memory, so first think of your product.
- Why do different product advertise?
- E.g. movie pre-release and post-release
- How affect demand curve?
- Pivot vs shift.


## Intensity of Advertising

- The intensity of advertising varies a lot across industries

| Industry Sector | Ad to <br> Sales <br> Ratio \% |
| :--- | :--- |
| Natural Resources \& Materials | 0.8 |
| Oil, Gas \& Chemicals | 0.3 |
| Consumer Products | 6.6 |
| Health Care | 3.5 |
| Retail | 1.8 |
| Financial Services | 0.9 |
| Electronics \& Scientific Instruments | 2.2 |
| Computers \& Software | 2.0 |

- The type of advertising varies across firms
- Pepsi - negative "taste test"
" Coke - positive "Life tastes good"
- More advertising in comp. industry, oligopoly or monopoly?
- More advertising with small firm or large firm?


## A Model

- Firm profits:

$$
\pi(a)=s(a) Q(a)[p-c]-k(a)
$$

- Demand expansion effect
- Depends on elasticity of whole sector
- Depends on market share of firm
- Business stealing effect
- Depends on differentiation
- Markup
- Depends on competitiveness of industry
- Efficiency of advertising
- Depends on ability to target customers


## How Measure Sensitivity/Effectiveness?

- Existing Data ("Secondary Research")
- Investor reports: annual report data, financial info, etc.
- Scan data, databases, set top boxes, subscriber lists, public company data
- Analytics (Behavioral data)
- Internal databases
- Digital behaviors
- Trend data
- Behavioral patterns

- New Data ("Primary Research")
, Quantitative - surveys, social monitoring
b Qualitative - Focus groups, online chats, in-home interviews
- Measurement - real behaviors, not self reported


## Advertising Strategy

- Single firm
- Suppose advertising shifts the demand curve.
- Care about the WTP of the marginal customer.
- Analogous to vertical differentiation.
- Like quality, advertising is also investment in brand equity.
- What if there are many firms?
- Advertising about features can soften price competition
b Consumers realize products differentiated.
- Spurious product differentiation (e.g. Nutrasweet vs. generics)
- Advertising about prices can increase price competition
- If prices known, firms can cut price to get more customers.


## Advertising - The Platform's Perspective

- Suppose you are Facebook, Twitter, or the NYTimes
- Key formula: Value = \#users $\times$ engagement $\times \$ /$ unit
- Raise number of users
- Appeal to new demographic; add value to new customers
- Raise engagement
- Add new features
- \$/unit
- Raise quality of ad via better targeting
- Make ads more integral
- How should Facebook, Twitter, NYTimes, best raise value?

