Time: Fridays, 12:30-2:00.
Location: Seminar Room, 5017A.
May 19: Simon, ``Contracting on Time''.
May 26: Mingxiao, ``Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers''.
June 2: Florian, ``Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts''.
June 9: Ettore, ``Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms''. Change of time: 10am-11.30am.
June 16: Zhe, ``Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation''.
June 23: No Workshop.
June 30: No Workshop.
July 7: Jean-Guillaume, ``Optimal Search Auctions'', by Crémer, Spiegel and Zheng.
July 14: Andreas, ``Waiting to Persuade'' and ``Bargaining Without a Common Prior - An Immediate Agreement Theorem''.
July 21: No Workshop.
July 28: No Workshop.
August 4: Kunio, ``Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations''.
August 11: Arvind, ``Optimism, deadline effect, and stochastic deadlines''.
Remarks:
Grubb, Screening Overconfident Consumers.
Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe The Optimal Degree of Monetary Policy Discretion. Ecta 2005.
Amador, Werning and Angeletos, Commitment vs. Flexibility. Ecta 2006.
Jackson and Sonnenschein "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions". Ecta, forthcoming.
DeMarzo and Fishman Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting with Privately Observed Cash Flows.
Demarzo and Sannikov A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure
Skreta, Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms. ReStud, forthcoming.
Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences. JET, forthcoming.
Sannikov A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem.
Fernandes and Phelan A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence. JET 2000.
Prescott and Townsend Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments. ReStud, forthcoming.
Guriev and Kvasov, Contracting on Time. AER, 2004.
Che and Sakovics, A Dynamic Theory of Holdup. Ecta 2004.
Che and Sakovics, “Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective.
Kaya, Repeated Signaling Games.
Skrzypacz and Kremer, Dynamic signaling and market breakdown. JET, forthcoming.
Swinkels Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers . ReStud, 1999. This one is a little old, but is one of the most interesting papers in recent years.
Skrzypacz and Sannikov, Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production.
Skrzypacz and Sannikov, The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions.
Sannikov Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time.
Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico Collusion and Price Rigidity. ReStud 2004.
Athey and Bagwell Optimal Collusion with Private Information. Rand 2001.
Athey and Miller Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations.
Athey and Bagwell Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks.
Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations Ecta, 2004.
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn Tacit collusion in repeated auctions , JET 2004.
Blume and Heidhues Private monitoring in auctions, JET forthcoming.
MacLeod and Malcomson Motivation and Markets, AER 1998. This one is a bit old, but it's a great introduction.
Fuchs Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations.
Plambeck and Taylor Partnership in a Dynamic Production System.
Thanassoulis, Optimal Stalling while Bargaining.
Benjamin, Fast Bargaining in Bankruptcy.
Yildiz, Optimism, deadline effect, and stochastic deadlines.
Yildiz, Waiting to Persuade. QJE, 2004.
Yildiz, Bargaining Without a Common Prior - An Immediate Agreement Theorem, Econometrica 2003.
Kocherlakota Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation , Ecta 2005.
Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation. Restud 2003.
Phelan Public Trust and Government Betrayal. JET, 2005.
Phelan Opportunity and Social Mobility. ReStud, forthcoming.
Albanesi and Sleet Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information. ReStud, forthcoming.
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics.
Battaglini and Coate Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis.
Burdett and Coles Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts, Ecta 2003.
.SITE conference, 2005. Dynamic Contracting.
Date: May 9, 2006