Publications
1. Sequentially
Optimal Mechanisms, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 73, Issue 4, pp. 1085-1111, October
2006, NAJ Review
2. Mechanism
Design for Arbitrary Type Spaces, Economics
Letters, 91, (2006) 293-299
Submitted
Papers
- The
Role of outside Options in Auction Design, with Nicolas Figueroa,
(Universidad de Chile). (longer
working paper version)
- On
the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure (Details of Example in Appendix B)
- Optimal Auctions with General Distributions
- A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms, with Nicolas Figueroa, (Universidad
de Chile) (longer working paper version) (Previous title: A Note on Optimal
Auctions)
- Optimal
Auction Design under Non-Commitment
(longer working paper version)
Working
Papers & Work in Progress
(email me for
most recent version)
- A Foundation of Dynamic
Bargaining with Incomplete Information with Ichiro Obara (UCLA, Minnesota)
- Dynamic
Strategic Information Transmission, with Mikhail Golosov (MIT), Aleh
Tsyvinski (Harvard), and Andrea Wilson (NYU)
- Cherry-Picking
and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation
with Laura Veldkamp, (NYU, Stern
School of Business)
- What
to Put on the Table, with Nicolas
Figueroa, (Universidad de Chile)
- Transparency and Commitment
- Interconnection
Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service
Objectives
- Certification and Markets, with
Hugo Hopenhayn (UCLA)