CHARACTERISTICS OF WORLDS WITH PERFECT STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION*

by

Earl A. Thompson
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90024

UCLA
Department of Economics
Working Paper #167
December, 1979

*The author benefitted substantially from discussions with Roger Faith, Louis Makowski, Joe Ostroy, and Lloyd Shapley. The current paper is a further development and generalization of the author's contributions to an unpublished, 1974-75, joint paper with Roger Faith entitled, "A Theory of Games with Truly Perfect Information."
PERFECT STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Earl A. Thompson

UCLA, Department of Economics
405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90024

A new model of rational, 2-person interaction is implicit, especially in the numerical examples of Chapter V, in Thomas Schelling's classic, The Strategy of Conflict. In the implicit model, one of the two players first commits himself to a reaction function and then the second player selects his rational action given the first's prior reaction function. The prior committed reaction function is that function which maximizes the first player's payoff given the known, rational response of the second player. Yet somehow, this implied model -- which employs substantially more information than the standard 2-person von Neumann-Morgenstern "perfect information" game in that one player is allowed to communicate his strategy to the other before the other selects his strategy -- has been largely neglected in subsequent theoretical analyses.¹

The present paper can be viewed as an attempt to remedy this neglect. In particular, the paper will: (1) Derive Schelling's implicit model from a prior model containing perfect information regarding the strategies of others and simultaneously generalize the model to n-players; (2) establish the existence and Pareto optimality of a solution allocation resulting from the general model given a finite set of possible outcomes and only strict preferences between possible outcomes; (3) show that indifference between possible outcomes allows Pareto nonoptima to enter the solution set under a certain condition; (4) show how the model is distinct from other game-theoretic models in that it contains a theory of individually rational communication.
and, correspondingly, a theory of individually rational "cooperation"; and (5) identify conditions under which the model's basic optimality characteristics hold up under a generalization admitting an endogenous determination of the order of strategy selection.

The following sections of this paper correspond, respectively, to these five extensions of Schelling's work. In addition, regarding possible empirical applications, Section III outlines a possible explanation for the appearance and disappearance of slavery while Section V outlines a possible explanation for an observed tendency toward efficiency in actual social institutions.
A. The Physical Environment and Institutional Possibilities

An individual is denoted \( i, i=1, \ldots, n \). An action of individual \( i \) is denoted \( x_i \), where \( x_i \in X_i \), a finite set of feasible actions of individual \( i \).

A possible social choice, or allocation, is defined by an \( n \)-dimensional set of actions, and is denoted \( x = (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n) \), so that \( x \in \prod X_i \). To describe individual preferences, each individual, \( i \), is given a complete, transitive, irreflexive, antisymmetric, binary relation, \( \succ_i \), defined over \( \prod X_i \). This description rules out indifference between elements of the finite set of possible allocations. The motivation for this assumption and the effects of indifference on our central results will be discussed later.

A Pareto optimum is an allocation, \( x', x' \in \prod X_i \), for which there is no alternative allocation, \( x'', x'' \in \prod X_i \), such that \( x'' \succ_i x' \) for all \( i \). Several Pareto optima may exist.

The institutional constraints on individual actions, i.e., the reactions of others to his actions, are not taken here as given; they are derived. When there is perfect strategic communication, this is done by allowing individuals to sequentially communicate their respective reaction functions. Thus, for perfect information regarding institutions, the first individual to establish and communicate a reaction function, labelled individual 1, presents the reaction function, \( x_1 = f_1(x_2, \ldots, x_n) \), to the other individuals; the second communicator, labelled individual 2, then presents \( x_2 = f_2(x_3, \ldots, x_n) \) to individuals 3 through \( n \); and so on up to the \( n-1 \)st communicator, who presents \( x_{n-1} = f_{n-1}(x_n) \) to the \( n \)th individual, who has no need to communicate. Once the action of the \( n \)th individual is taken, the action of the \( n-1 \)st individual is determined. Once this pair of actions is taken, the action of individual \( n-3 \) is determined, and so on up until an allocation is determined.
as a chain reaction from the \( n^{\text{th}} \) individual's action. The set \( (f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_{n-1}) \) is thus a complete institutional description. The feasible choice set, or strategy set, of individual 1 is the set of all functions from \( \prod_{i=2}^{n} X_i \) to \( X_1 \).

This can be represented by the functional variable, \( F_1 \). Similarly, \( F_2, \ldots, F_{n-1} \) can be used to represent the respective strategy sets of individuals 2 to \( n-1 \). The product space, \( \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} F_i \), thus represent the world's institutional possibilities. Denoting \( n \)'s strategy set, \( X_n \), by \( F_n \), and his choice, \( x_n \), by \( f_n \), \( F = (F_1, \ldots, F_n) \) denotes the social strategy space and \( f = (f_1, \ldots, f_n) \) a particular outcome. 3

While Howard has considered a game containing strategies contingent on the strategies of subsequent strategy selectors, he adopts a Nash solution concept, wherein the first strategy selector accepts as given the strategies of subsequent strategy selectors. This is, of course, generally irrational under perfect strategic communication. For the choice of the first strategy selector may obviously affect the choice of the subsequent strategy selectors.

The solution concept appropriate to perfect strategic communication is a von Neumann-Morgenstern perfect information solution concept.

B. Equilibrium Institutions, or "Solutions."

A solution, \( (f_1^*, \ldots, f_n^*) \), is a set in which the \( i^{\text{th}} \) variable is, for each \( i \), maximal with respect to \( \succ_i \) for given values of \( f_1, \ldots, f_{i-1} \). A solution can be constructed as follows: First, we find, for individual \( n \), \( f_n^* \), the point in \( F_n \) such that, for all \( f_n \neq f_n^* \), \( f_n \in F_n \):

\[
\left\{ f_1(f_2, \ldots, f_{n-1}, f_n^*), f_2(f_3, \ldots, f_n^*), \ldots, f_n \left( f_1(f_2, \ldots, f_{n-1}, f_n^*), f_2(f_3, \ldots, f_n^*), \ldots, f_n \right) \right\}
\]

This solution determines a dependency of \( f_n^* \) on \( f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_{n-1} \), which we write \( f_n^*[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-1}] \). Then, for individual \( n-1 \), we find a reaction function,
in $F_{n-1}$, $f^*_n$, such that for all $f_{n-1} \in F_{n-1}$, $f_{n-1} \neq f^*_{n-1}$,
\[
\{f_1(f_2, \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}, f_{n-1}^*[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}]), \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}, f_{n-1}^*[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}]\}_{n-1}
\]
\[
\{f_1(f_2, \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}, f_{n-1}^*[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}]), \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}, f_{n-1}^*[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-2}, f^*_{n-1}]\}.
\]
This solution determines the dependency of $f^*_{n-1}$ on $f_1, f_2, \ldots$, and $f_{n-2}$, which we describe as $f^*_{n-1}[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-2}]$. Then, for individual $n-2$, we find a reaction function, $f^*_{n-2}$, such that, for all $f_{n-2} \in F_{n-2}$, $f_{n-2} \neq f^*_{n-2}$,
\[
\{f_1(f_2, \ldots, f^*_n, f^*_{n-1}[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-2}], f_{n-1}^*[f_1, \ldots, f^*_{n-1}, f^*_{n-2}], f^*_{n-2}[f_1, \ldots, f^*_{n-2}])\}
\]
\[
\{f_1(f_2, \ldots, f^*_n, f^*_{n-1}[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-2}], f_{n-1}^*[f_1, \ldots, f^*_{n-1}, f^*_{n-2}], f^*_{n-2}[f_1, \ldots, f^*_{n-2}])\}.
\]
This solution thus determines the dependency of $f^*_{n-2}$ on $f_1, f_2, \ldots$, and $f_{n-3}$, which we write as $f^*_{n-2}[f_1, \ldots, f_{n-3}]$. The process continues until we have determined $f^*_{1}$. Since $f^*_{1}$ does not depend on any prior functions, we can use it to determine the succeeding reaction functions by successively substituting starred values into $f^*_{2}[f_1]$, $f^*_{3}[f_1, f_2]$, ..., and $f^*_{n-1}[f_1, f_2, \ldots, f_{n-2}]$.

In this way, a solution, $f^* = (f^*_1, f^*_2, \ldots, f^*_n)$, which implies a solution allocation, $x^* = (x^*_1, x^*_2, \ldots, x^*_n)$, is determined.

The finite structure of the successive maximization problems, along with the completeness and transitivity of $\succsim_1$, assures us that a solution always exists.
II. PARETO OPTIMALITY

The institutions formed under perfect strategic communication induce Pareto optimal allocations. To prove this, suppose the solution, $x^*$, is not Pareto optimal. Then there is a point, $x^0 \in \prod X_i$ such that $x^0 \succ_i x^*$ for all $i = 1 \ldots n$. A set of reaction functions generating $x^0$ as an allocation is given by $(f_1^0, \ldots, f_{n-1}^0)$. Of course $(f_1^*, \ldots, f_{n-1}^*) \neq (f_1^0, \ldots, f_{n-1}^0)$; otherwise, $x^0$ would be the solution. Now let individual 1 consider:

\[(A) \quad f_1(f_2, \ldots, f_n) = \begin{cases} f_1^0 & \text{if } (f_2, \ldots, f_n) = (f_2^0, \ldots, f_n^0) \\ f_1^* & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}\]

This may induce each subsequent strategy selector to reorder his strategy in $(f_2^0, \ldots, f_n^0)$ relative to $(f_2^*, \ldots, f_n^*)$. However, as it does not alter the allocations resulting from non-solution strategies other than $(f_2^0, \ldots, f_n^0)$, it does not alter anyone's ordering of these other strategies relative to $(f_2^*, \ldots, f_n^*)$. Therefore, because $x^0 \succ x^*$, individual 1 is no worse off under (A) than under his original strategy.

We next let individual 2 consider, in view of (A),

\[(B) \quad f_2(f_3, \ldots, f_n) = \begin{cases} f_2^0 & \text{if } (f_3, \ldots, f_n) = (f_3^0, \ldots, f_n^0) \\ f_2^* & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}\]

This similarly cannot hurt individual 2. We continue on to individual n, who now faces (A), (B), \ldots. Thus, $(f_1^0, \ldots, f_n^0) = x^0$ will result if he picks $x_n = x_n^0$; and $(f_1^*, \ldots, f_n^*)$ if he picks his solution action. Since $x^0 \succ x^*$, he picks the former. The supposition that there is a Pareto nonoptimal solution is thus immediately contradicted: For the supposition implies that the players individually prefer a non-solution set of strategies, $(f_1^0, \ldots, f_n^0)$, to the solution set, $(f_1^*, \ldots, f_n^*)$. 
III. THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY INDIFFERENCE

If someone other than the first strategy selector were indifferent between two or more possible solution strategies, a prior selector, who would otherwise have no way of knowing what the indifferent one would do, would - assuming that he could perform a reaction that would leave this later selector uniformly worse off than in a solution - simply adjust his reactions to all but one of the later-selected strategies so as to make these strategies suboptimal for the later selector. The resulting solution in this case is also Pareto optimal, as can be seen by noting that our above optimality proof also applies here as long as the Pareto dominating strategy used in the proof is still feasible, which is the case because no prior strategy selector, in inducing a specific choice of a later selector between strategies about which the later selector would otherwise be indifferent, would eliminate the Pareto superior strategy choice.

However, when the first strategy selector is indifferent, Pareto non-optima may easily arise. Consider the following, "slave master's insensitivity," payoff matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>work</th>
<th>rest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>slave</td>
<td>( x_2 )</td>
<td>( x_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>master beat the slave</td>
<td>( x_1 )</td>
<td>5, -10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>master insult the slave</td>
<td>( x_1 )</td>
<td>10, -4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leave the slave alone</td>
<td>( x_1 )</td>
<td>10, 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The standard, VNM-Nash, no-regret solution has the slave resting while the master insults the slave; this is both nonoptimal and empirically unrealistic!)
The solution set under perfect strategic communication, with the master as the first strategy selector, contains the Pareto optimum (10, 0) where the master will beat the slave if he rests and leave him alone if he works. But the set also contains (10, -4), as the master may also insult the slave, lowering the slave's benefit to -4 without altering either the master's payoff or the slave's optimal decision. The point, (10, -4), is obviously Pareto inferior to (10, 0).

The exercise of Section II can be repeated for a weak preference relation to show that if $x^*$, a Pareto nonoptimum, is a solution, so is $x^0$. Hence, although the solution set with weak preference relations may sometimes contain a Pareto nonoptimal point, it must always also contain a Pareto optimum.

Because all standard competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal, economists have grown accustomed to the thought that individual indifference between various possible equilibria is unimportant. But, as individual indifference between the possible equilibria of a master-slave relationship can induce Pareto nonoptima, we should guard against the habit of ignoring solution indifference when examining decentralized slave economies. Apparently, the real world has not ignored the problem. As our model would predict, observed decentralized slavery systems have arisen only through the capture of social "outsiders" toward which initial benevolence could hardly have been widespread among insiders (Finlay) and have dissolved not by slave uprisings or voluntary manumissions but, at least in modern times, by the intervention of politically powerful humanitarians armed with a "moral argument" (Finlay) based on examples in which slaves were torn from their families, worked to death, tortured, or broken of spirit for the minor conveniences of their only mildly benevolent, and therefore largely indifferent, masters.
IV. CONTRAST WITH COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY

The commitment of our players to their communicated strategies simultaneously prevents them from forming the blocking coalitions with subsequent strategy selectors that they would under the narrowly rational decision structure of standard cooperative game theory (e.g., Owen). It is such narrowly rational decision-making, or implicitly imperfect strategic communication, that is responsible for the generally unsatisfactory, overly full or empty, solution sets in standard cooperative game theory.

Consider, for example, a "majority game," a three person, zero sum, game in which, say, a dime and a nickel are to be shared by the three players. If players 1 and 2 each select certain actions implying that they "get together," 2 gets a dime and 1 gets a nickel. If 1 and 3 each select certain actions, where the action is different for 1 than in the former case, then 1 gets a dime and 3 gets a nickel. If 2 and 3 each select new actions implying that they "get together," then 3 gets a dime and 2 gets a nickel. Cooperative game theory offers no meaningful solution to this game because, for any distribution of coins, there is a blocking coalition. Under perfect strategic communication, where the order of strategic selection is, say, 1, 2, 3, player 1 will adopt the following strategy: "I will get together with 2 if he gets together with me; otherwise, I will perform my part of getting together with 3." Player 2 then selects: "I will perform my part of getting together with 1 regardless of the action of player 3. Player 3 gets nothing no matter what he does. It is easy to verify that there is no other solution. In sharp contrast, under standard cooperative game theory, 3 would offer to get together with 1, who -- being unable to commit himself to a fixed response -- would be unable to refuse the offer. And we would be off on the never-ending cycle of coalition formation characteristic of standard cooperative game theory.
V. Determination of Hierarchical Positions and Empirical Application

While one may think of the order of strategy selection in the above model as being arbitrarily determined by the "rules of the game," or by "initial endowments," it is much more realistic to determine the order of strategy selection in a higher order game. When the higher order game contains an outside player who assigns hierarchical positions through his ability to punish inside players, such an outsider may alter the above solution by also constraining the forms of insider reaction functions, essentially imposing his own prior, not-necessarily-rational, reaction function. The model of this paper need not apply in this case. A model attempting a realistic description of such prior constraints, and a demonstration of the simultaneous existence of an equilibrium order of strategy selection and a set of constrained strategies under noncompetitive interdependence, is developed in another study (Thompson-Faith, 1979). This study finds that the constrained reaction function equilibrium is still approximately Pareto optimal. This optimality result, when complemented by numerous others of this author and associates indicating the approximate Pareto optimality of observed government policy responses to forms of market failure other than noncompetitive interdependence, indicates that a powerful force toward Pareto optimality underlies observed institutions.

Our model would predict this optimality result if we could assume that: (1) the outside players imposed rational constraints and (2) a prior, hierarchy-determining, higher order game containing no outside players had no effect on the optimality properties of the lower-order game. The second assumption, as well as the first, is plausible. For while the anarchistic battle for hierarchical position that occurs in the absence of an umpire
or outside enforcer is a war-like, generally Pareto inefficient, Nash-VNM non-cooperative struggle to establish prior commitments, war losses are strictly sunk costs once a hierarchy is formed and our own, lower-order game is ready to be played. Hence, once the natural, unavoidable, dead-weight losses in establishing a hierarchy have been incurred, our model can be applied. Its central optimality results then serve to explain the observed tendency toward efficiency in actual social institutions.
FOOTNOTES

1 This is perhaps because Professor Schelling did not properly contrast his implied game-theoretic model with more conventional games. In particular, he did not see that he was merely applying the Zermelo-von Neumann-Morgenstern perfect information solution concept to strategies rather than actions (or "plays of a game"). While von Neumann and Morgenstern explicitly recognized (8, Section 11.3) that games could be constructed in which strategies are communicated in the same way as the actions in their perfect information games, they saw nothing novel about such games. For such games pose no new problem in the development of solution concepts or the existence of solutions. Perhaps, had they been more interested in evaluating the Pareto optimality of solution actions or in formally capturing the microeconomics of social institutions, they would have devoted more intellectual resources to games with perfect information concerning strategies as well as actions. But von Neumann and Morgenstern also expressed serious doubts about having players rely on the rationality of others, a reliance required by their perfect information solution concept. Their argument supporting these doubts (Ibid., Sec. 4.1.2) is that it may pay a player to deviate from "rational" responses if he knows that another player's strategy depends on his responses. But it is precisely these deviations that are at the heart of any theory of strategic communication, a theory that allows some players to make rational deviations out of a set of possible deviations from what otherwise would be their future rational choices. For example, since the last deliverer in a transaction always has an incentive to withhold delivery, he must devise and communicate a commitment to deviate in a specified way
from his narrowly rational last response in order to induce prior deliveries by others. Von Neumann and Morgenstern did not see that their justifiable skepticism with respect to their "perfect information" game leads towards the adoption of games with more information than appears in their "perfect information" game rather than towards the imperfect information games which they so elegantly explored.

2 This is not to say that conventional cooperative game theory cannot be reformulated to produce effects which are similar to those characterizing our generalization of Schelling's model. Indeed such a reformulation has been recently achieved by Rosenthal. Section IV will indicate, however, that the basic assumptions of cooperative game theory are inconsistent with perfect strategic communication.

3 A question may arise as to why some individuals do not present reaction functions to other individuals who are higher up in the communication hierarchy. Consider individual n. Facing the prior strategies of the other n-1 individuals, he sees that the eventual allocation must be consistent with the chosen reaction functions of each of the n-1 prior selectors. Hence, if individual n responds to the prior selectors with a simple action, he will have a free choice over all allocations consistent with the prior reaction functions. But if n responds with a function of prior actions, thus giving further choices to the prior strategy selectors, he can only reduce his original choice out of the same set of possible allocations. He cannot expand the set of possible outcomes because any eventual outcome must be consistent with the given n-1 reaction functions. Similarly, if the n-1st strategy selector presents a reaction function rather than an
action to his prior strategy selectors for a given action of individual n, he is giving them the choice of actions consistent with the set of reaction functions he faces and thus can be no better off. This also applies, in like fashion, to individuals n-2 to 2, so that it is in no individual's interest to present a reaction function to a prior strategy selector.

While abolition has sometimes also served to redistribute away from the masters, as it apparently did in the American South in view of the slow pace of Southern Reconstruction, in most cases freed slaves have become serfs or debt-peons who provide about the same benefit as do slaves to the capitalist class (Finlay). The social advantage of serfdom and debt-peonage is that they prevent local slave master's insensitivity problems, the former having central authorities rigidly controlling the taxation of the immobile serfs and the latter, by granting a choice of creditor-employers to the peon, inducing the prospective employers to compete away payment systems which harm the worker without benefiting the employer.
REFERENCES


