AUCTION THEORY WITH PRIVATE VALUES

by

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For many centuries auctions have been a common form of selling procedure. Although auction methods vary across country and product, the two most frequently observed are the open, ascending bid (or English) auction and the sealed bid auction. Recent theoretical research has led to a theory of equilibrium bidding in these two auctions and a wide range of alternatives as well. As a result it has been possible to compare the revenue extracted by the seller under different auction methods and even to characterize the revenue maximizing auction.

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem (cf., Vickrey [1961], Myerson [1981], and Riley and Samuelson [1981]) asserts that when each bidder's reservation price for a unit of an indivisible good is an independent draw from the same distribution, and bidders are risk neutral, the sealed bid auction generates the same expected revenue as the open auction. Much recent research has involved weakening each of the main hypotheses — risk neutrality, identically distributed values and independence of values — in turn. We shall illustrate some of the principal conclusions of this work by considering the properties of open and sealed bid auctions in a model of two bidders whose reservation prices can assume only two values and by comparing these auctions to the "optimal" or revenue-maximizing auction.

I. Revenue Equivalence

Imagine that the reservation price of bidder 1 (i = 1,2) can assume the values $v_H$ (with probability $p_H$) and $v_L$ (with probability $1-p_H$), where $v_H > v_L > 0$. Bidders' values are private information and independently distributed. Bidders are risk neutral, i.e., they maximize the expression.

\begin{equation}
(1) \quad \text{(probability of winning)} \cdot v - \text{expected payment}
\end{equation}
We suppose that an open auction proceeds by the auctioneer's continuously raising the asking price. The auction concludes when one of the bidders drops out. The remaining bidder is the winner and pays the dropout price (if both bidders drop out simultaneously, a coin is flipped to determine the winner). Given these rules, one can easily confirm that a bidder's unique (perfect) equilibrium strategy is to drop out when the asking price reaches his reservation price. (There are other "nonperfect" equilibria, cf., Maskin and Riley [1983a]). Thus the expected payoff of a $v_L$-bidder (a bidder whose reservation price is $v_L$) is zero, and his probability of winning is $\frac{1}{2}(1-p)$. The expected payoff of a $v_H$-bidder, by contrast, is his surplus if the other bidder is "low" (since then the asking prices only reaches $v_L$ rather than $v_H$) times the probability of that event, i.e., $(1-p)(v_H-v_L)$. Since a $v_H$ bidder wins when the other bidder has a low value and wins half the time when the other bidder has a high value, his probability of winning is $\frac{1}{2}p + (1-p)$.

In the sealed bid auction, bidders submit bids simultaneously. The higher bidder is the winner (ties again are resolved by coin flips) and he pays his bid. Consider a symmetric equilibrium. Because the distribution of values is discrete, the equilibrium will involve mixed strategies. Notice first that a $v_L$-bidder (one whose reservation price is $v_L$) will never bid more than $v_L$ because, if he did, the maximum of such bids (if bidders use mixed strategies, that randomize over a variety of alternative bids) would win the auction with positive probability, inducing a negative expected payoff. Let $b_L$ be the infimum of all bids submitted.

Suppose first that $b_L < v_L$. Then bidders bid below $v_L$ with positive probability and so a $v_L$-bidder's expected payoff is positive. Suppose furthermore, that bidder 1 bids $b_L$ with positive probability. Then bidder 2's chances of winning increase discontinuously if he bids just more then $b_L$. 
while his payment if he wins scarcely rises, thereby raising his expected payoff. But this is a violation of symmetry. On the other hand, if \( b_L \) is not bid with positive probability, then bids near \( b_L \) have almost no chance of winning, contradicting the positive expected payoff.\(^1\)

Next let \( b_H \) be the infimum of bids made by a \( v_H \)-bidder. If \( b_H > v_L \), then a bid strictly between \( b_H \) and \( v_L \) has the same chance of winning as \( b_H \), and so is preferable. Thus \( b_H = v_L \), and a \( v_H \)-bidder's expected payoff must be \( (v_H - v_L)(1-p) \). In equilibrium, any bid \( b \) made as part of a mixed strategy must generate the same expected payoff. Therefore if \( F(b) \) is the cumulative distribution function of a \( v_H \)-bidder's bid, it satisfies

\[
(pF(b) + 1-p)(v_H-b) = (1-p)(v_H-v_L)
\]

By symmetry, a \( v_H \)-bidder's expected probability of winning is \( \frac{1}{2}p + (1-p) \), whereas that of a \( v_L \)-bidder is \( \frac{1}{2}(1-p) \). Because a given type of bidder's probability of winning and expected payoff are the same in the open and sealed bid auction, formula (1) implies that his expected payment is the same in the two auctions. We have established the Revenue Equivalence Theorem for our model. Indeed, we obtain the same expected revenue from any other auction in which the high bidder wins, the expected payoff of a \( v_L \)-bidder is zero, and the expected payoff of a \( v_H \)-bidder is \( (1-p)(v_H-v_L) \).

It is of some interest to compare the open end sealed bid auctions with a revenue-maximizing auction (cf., Myerson [1981] and Riley and Samuelson [1981]). Suppose that bidders were offered the choice between bidding \( v_L \) or \( b_H = \frac{1}{2}v_H + \frac{1}{2}(1-p)v_L)/(\frac{1}{2}p + 1-p) \), with, as always, the high bidder winning. Because \( b_H \) is greater than \( v_L \), a \( v_L \)-bidder will bid \( v_L \). Since \( (\frac{1}{2}p + 1-p)(v_H-b_H) = \frac{1}{2}(1-p)(v_H-v_L) \), a \( v_H \)-bidder is indifferent between bidding \( b_H \) and \( v_L \), and so might as well choose the former. Since a \( v_H \)-bidder bidding \( b_H \) has the same probability of winning as in an open or sealed bid
auction \(\frac{1}{2} p + (1-p)\) but has a lower expected payoff, \(\frac{1}{2} (1-p) (v_H - v_L)\) rather than \((1-p)(v_H - v_L)\), his expected payment must be higher. Thus, this alternative auction generates higher expected revenue. Indeed, it is optimal if \(v_L > p v_H\). (If \(v_L < p v_H\) it is optimal to set a reserve price at \(v_H\), thereby rejecting all lower bids.) In either case, the optimal auction differs from the open and sealed bid auctions by prohibiting bidders from making certain bids. This conclusion generalizes to more complicated models, including those with a continuum of possible reservation prices.

II. Risk Aversion

Let us modify the model of Section I only by supposing that bidders are risk averse. Let \(u\) be a strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, normalized so that \(u(0) = 0\). A \(v\)-bidder's payoff if he wins and pays \(t\) is \(u(v-t)\); his payoff if he loses and pays \(t\) is \(u(-t)\).

Risk aversion does not alter bidders' behavior in the open auction; it is still optimal for a bidder to drop out exactly when his reservation price is reached. Hence expected revenue is as before. In the sealed bid auction, \(v_L\)-bidders continue to bid \(v_L\), and if \(F_R\) is the c.d.f. of a \(v_H\)-bidder's bid, it satisfies the analogue of condition (2):

\[
(3) \quad u(v_H-b) [(1-p) + pF_R(b)] = u(v_H-v_L)(1-p).
\]

The strict concavity of \(u\) implies that \(\frac{u(v_H-v_L)}{u(v_H-b)} < \frac{v_H-v_L}{v_H-b}\) for \(v_L < b < v_H\). Hence, (2) and (3) imply that \(F_R(b) < F(b)\) with strict inequality for bids greater than \(v_L\) but less than the maximum. That is, \(F_R\) stochastically dominates \(F\), and so the expected bid by a \(v_H\)-bidder is higher with risk aversion than without. We conclude that, with risk aversion, a sealed bid auction generates greater expected revenue than an open auction (cf., Butters [1975] and Holt [1980]). Intuitively, increasing a bidder's risk aversion
heightens his fear of losing and so, in a sealed bid auction, induces him to bid higher. Viewed alternatively a sealed bid auction, unlike an open auction, insures a winning bidder against fluctuations in the amount he has to pay, and a risk averse bidder is willing to pay a premium -- in the form of a higher bid -- for this insurance.

By requiring payments even of losing bidders, an optimal auction (cf., Maskin and Riley [1984] and Matthews [1983]) can exploit the fact that a risk averse bidder's marginal utility of income depends on whether he wins or loses. Let \( \pi_i \) be the probability of winning and \( b_i \) and \( a_i \) the payments by a winning and losing bidder, respectively, of type \( i \) (\( i = L, H \)). An optimal auction chooses \( \pi_i \), \( b_i \), and \( a_i \) to maximize

\[
(4) \quad p(\pi_H b_H + (1-\pi_H)a_H) + (1-p)(\pi_L b_L + (1-\pi_L)a_L)
\]

subject to

\[
(5) \quad \pi_H u(v_H - b_H) + (1-\pi_H)u(-a_H) > \pi_L u(v_H - b_L) + (1-\pi_L)u(-a_L)
\]

\[
(6) \quad \pi_L u(v_L - b_L) + (1-\pi_L)u(-a_L) > 0
\]

\[
(7) \quad \frac{1}{2} p + (1-p) < \pi_H
\]

\[
(8) \quad \frac{1}{2} > p\pi_H + (1-p)\pi_L
\]

and

\[
(9) \quad \pi_H > 0 \text{ and } \pi_L > 0.
\]

Constraint (5), a self-selection constraint, ensures that a \( v_H \)-bidder is at least as well off making a high as a low bid. We have omitted the analogous self-selection constraint for a \( v_L \)-bidder since, as we shall see, it is satisfied automatically. Constraint (6) guarantees a \( v_L \)-bidder a nonnegative expected payoff from participating. (Given (5), a \( v_H \)-bidder's payoff will also be nonnegative.) Condition (7) says that a \( v_H \)-bidder can win with at
most probability 1 if the other bidder has a low reservation price and, given the symmetry of the model, with at most probability 1/2 is the other bidder's reservation price is high. Constraint (8) requires simply that each bidder's probability of winning, unconditional on his reservation price, not exceed 1/2.

Letting \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) be the Lagrange multipliers for (5) and (6), respectively, we obtain the first order conditions

\[
\begin{align*}
\left\{ 
\begin{array}{l}
p\pi_H - \alpha\pi_H u'(v_H - b_H) = 0 \\
p(1-\pi_H) - \alpha(1-\pi_H)u'(-a_H) = 0
\end{array}
\right.
\]

and

\[
\left\{ 
\begin{array}{l}
(1-p)\pi_L + \alpha\pi_L u'(v_H - b_L) - \beta\pi_L u'(v_L - b_L) = 0 \\
(1-p)(1-\pi_L) + \alpha(1-\pi_L)u'(-a_L) - \beta(1-\pi_L)u'(-a_L) = 0.
\end{array}
\right.
\]

From (10) we find that \( v_H - b_H = -a_H \), i.e., a high bidder is perfectly insured; he receives a monetary transfer \(-a_H(>0)\), as compensation if he loses. From (11) and the fact that \( u'(v_H - b_L) < u'(v_L - b_L) \),

\[
(\beta - \alpha)u'(-a_L) = 1-p > (\beta - \alpha)u'(v_L - b_L)
\]

Thus a \( v_L \)-bidder is better off winning than losing \((v_L - b_L > -a_L)\). Moreover, since (from (12)) (6) is binding, he must actually pay a penalty if he loses \((a_L > 0)\), which we can interpret as an entry fee. Because (5) is binding and \( v_H - b_L > -a_L \), we have \( v_H - b_H < v_H - b_L \), i.e., a \( v_H \)-winner pays more than a \( v_L \)-winner. If (8) is binding, as it will be if \( p \) is small enough, we can solve for \( \pi_L \) and rewrite (4) as \( p\pi_H(b_H-a_H-b_L+a_L) + p\alpha_H + (\frac{1}{2}-p)a_L. \) From the above argument, \( b_H - a_H - b_L + a_L > v_H - v_L > 0. \) Hence, constraint (7) is binding: \( \pi_H = \frac{1}{2}p + (1-p). \)
We conclude that an optimal auction with risk averse bidders resembles that for risk neutral bidders. Bidders are offered the choice between two prices \( b_H \) and \( b_L \) (if, as before, \( p \) is not too high) and the high bid wins. However, if a bidder loses with a bid of \( b_H \), he is compensated for losing, whereas if he loses with a bid of \( b_L \), he is penalized. Intuitively, introducing a penalty heightens a risk averse bidder's fear of losing and therefore increases the revenue that can be extracted from a \( v_H \)-bidder. Of course, this penalty, by increasing risk, reduces the payment that a \( v_L \)-bidder makes. But the penalty has no effect to the first order, since, with no penalty, a \( v_L \)-bidder is perfectly insured.

It remains only to show that the solution to the program of maximizing (4) subject to (5)-(9) satisfies

\[
\pi_L u(v_L-b_L) + (1-\pi_L)u(-a_L) > \pi_H u(v_L-b_H) + (1-\pi_H)u(-a_H),
\]

the self-selection constraint for \( v_L \)-bidders. But (13) follows immediately from the facts that (5) holds with equality and \( \pi_H u'(v-b_H) > \pi_L u'(v-b_L) \)

(since \( \pi_H > 1_L \) and \( b_H > b_L \)) for all \( v \).

III. Asymmetry

Let us revert to risk neutrality but now drop the assumption that valuations are identically distributed. Specifically, assume that bidder 1's reservation price is distributed as in Section I but that bidder 2's reservation price is either \( w_H \) or \( w_L \) with probabilities \( q \) and \( 1-q \), respectively. Continue to suppose that the two bidders' distributions are independent. For convenience, let us suppose that \( v_L = w_L = 0 \). Then the expected revenue generated by the open auction is

\[
pq \min\{v_H, w_H\}.
\]
We wish to compare the difference in revenues, $\Delta$, between the sealed bid and open auctions. To do this we shall consider two polar cases of asymmetry: (i) both bidders have the same probability of being high but have different high values, i.e., $p = q$ and $v_H \neq w_H$, and (ii) both bidders have the same high values but different probabilities, i.e., $v_H = w_H$ and $p \neq q$.

It is not difficult to see that in case (i), $\Delta$ is positive. We know from Section I that when $v_H = w_H$, $\Delta$ is zero. Now imagine raising $w_H$ above $v_H$. This does not affect revenue from the open auction since there is no change in the distribution of the second highest reservation value. However, with a higher $w_H$, the optimal response in the sealed bid auction by bidder 2, when $v = w_H$, to bidder 1's equilibrium strategy, is a higher bid. Bidder 2's higher bid, in turn, induces bidder 1 to bid higher than before (for details see Maskin and Riley [1983b]). Hence, revenue from the sealed bid auction rises, and $\Delta$ becomes positive.

In case (ii) expected revenue in the open auction is $pqv_H$. In the sealed bid auction, the equilibrium c.d.f.'s, $F_1$ and $F_2$, of the bids of bidders 1 and 2, when their reservation prices are $v_H$, satisfy the analogue of (2):

\[(15) \quad (1+q+qF_2(b))(v_H-b) = (1-q + qF_2(0))v_H\]

and

\[(16) \quad (1-p+pF_1(b))(v_H-b) = (1-p + pF_1(0))v_H.\]

Notice that right hand sides of (15) and (16) allow for the possibility that a $v_H$-bidder will bid zero (actually, infinitesimally more than zero) with positive probability. This will be the case if $p \neq q$ since both bidders must make the same maximum bid $\bar{b}_H$ when their reservation price equals $v_H$. 
and (15) and (16) can be satisfied for \( b = \bar{b}_H \) only if one of \( F_1(0) \) and \( F_2(0) \) is nonzero. For example, if \( p > q \), then (15) and (16) imply that

\[
\bar{b}_H = qv_H = pv_H(1-F_1(0)),
\]

and so \( F_1(0) = 1 - q/p \). Integrating (15), we obtain \( qzv_H \) as the expected payment by bidder 1 if his reservation price if \( v_H \), where \( z = \int F_2(b) dF_1(b) \). Similarly, from (16), the expected payment by bidder 2 is \( (p(1-z) + q-p)v_H \). Hence total expected revenue is \( q^2v_H \), which is less than the open auction revenue, \( pqv_H \). Therefore, for case (ii), \( \Delta \) is negative.

Roughly speaking, the sealed bid auction generates more revenue than the open auction when bidders have distributions with the same shape (but different supports), whereas the open auction dominates when, across bidders, distributions have different shapes but approximately the same support.

IV. Correlation

Let us return to the model of Section I except now assume that reservation prices are correlated across bidders. Specifically, let \( r_{ij} \) \((i,j \in [L,H])\) be the joint probability that bidder 1's value is \( v_i \) and that bidder 2's value is \( v_j \). Correlation implies that

\[
(17) \quad r_{HH}r_{LL} - r_{HL}r_{LH} \neq 0.
\]

As usual, behavior in the open auction remains the same, and so expected revenue is

\[
(18) \quad r_{HH}v_H + (1-r_{HH})v_L.
\]

Making the obvious modifications in the analysis of Section I, we conclude that expected revenue for the sealed bid auction is also (18). This equivalence between the two auctions does not generalize to distributions with more than two point supports because, in general, with correlation, a higher
reservation price does not imply a higher bid for the sealed bid auction (although it does for the open auction). Any condition sufficient to guarantee that bids are monotonic in reservation prices, however, ensures equivalence. One such condition is that the reservation prices be affiliated, that is, pairwise positively correlated across bidders (cf., Milgrom and Weber [1982]).

When (17) holds, an optimal auction extracts all surplus from bidders (cf., Crémer and McLean [1985]). To see this let \( c_{ij} \) \( (i,j \in \{L,H\}) \) be the payment the bidder 1 makes when his \( v = v_1 \) and bidder 2's \( v = v_2 \). To extract all surplus the \( c_{ij} \)'s must satisfy

\[
\frac{1}{2} r_{LL} v_L - r_{LH} c_{LH} - r_{HH} c_{HH} = 0 \\
\left(\frac{1}{2} r_{LH} + r_{LL}\right) v_L - r_{LH} c_{HH} - r_{LL} c_{HL} < 0 \\
\left(\frac{1}{2} r_{HH} + r_{HL}\right) v_H - r_{HH} c_{HH} - r_{HL} c_{HL} = 0 \\
\frac{1}{2} r_{HL} v_L - r_{HH} c_{LH} - r_{HL} c_{LL} < 0
\]

Equations (19) and (21) require the surplus of \( v_L \)- and \( v_H \)-bidders, respectively, to be zero. Inequality (20) ensures that a \( v_L \)-bidder is not better off bidding as a \( v_H \)-bidder, and (22) imposes the corresponding constraint on a \( v_H \)-bidder. But from (17), we can solve for \( c_{ij} \)'s that satisfy (19)-(22)).

V. Concluding Remarks

We have discussed three major hypotheses of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, but there remain two more implicit in our formulation. One is the assumption that only a single item is sold. If buyers have downward sloping demand curves and there are multiple units for sale, the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem again fails. Extrapolating from some simple examples we conjecture that open bidding will tend to dominate sealed bidding in this environment.

The second assumption is that a bidder's reservation price does not affect the reservation price of any other bidder. This is the "independent values" hypothesis: the assumption that reservation prices are a matter of taste rather than a reflection of information about the intrinsic value of the good. In the latter case, the "common values" model -- the open auction tends to produce higher revenue than the sealed bid when our other hypotheses are maintained (cf., Milgrom and Weber [1982]).
Footnotes

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1Our argument here assumes that the equilibrium in the sealed bid auction is symmetric. One can show (Maskin and Riley [1983a]) that there is no asymmetric equilibrium.

2As our model is formulated, an equilibrium in the sealed bid auction may not exist. The nonexistence problem, however, is an artifact of our allowing literally a continuum of possible bids. In fact, we can restore existence even with a continuum by allowing the possibility of positive but infinitesimal bids, which we implicitly assume in our analysis.

3If, say, bidder 1's maximum bid were greater than that of bidder 2, 1 could lower his bid without reducing his probability of winning.

4Suppose, for example, that \( v \) can take on three possible values: \( v_H > v_M > v_L \). Assume that if \( v = v_H \) for one bidder, then it is very likely that \( v = v_L \) for the other bidder. Assume furthermore that if \( v = v_M \) for one bidder then the other bidder in all likelihood has the same reservation price. In this case, a \( v_M \)-bidder will bid higher on average than a \( v_L \)-bidder in the sealed bid auction. Furthermore, the sealed bid auction, at least for some parameter values, generates strictly more revenue than does the open auction.
References


