Econ 271A: Industrial Organization John Riley Course Information: Time & Room: 11-1:45 Wednesday; Bunche 2249 Office Hours: 1:00-2:00 pm, Tuesday and by appointment Contact: John Riley: riley@econ.ucla.edu; 310-825-1541 Note: Some of the readings and lecture notes can be found on this password protected page
Topics to be covered in this course will include (1) monopoly and price discrimination; (2) dynamic price competition and tacit collusion; (3) theory of the firm; (4) signaling and limit pricing; (9) auctions and bidding. Prerequisites: First year economics graduate core courses. Textbook: There is
no required text. You might wish to read chapters
in Requirements:
There will be severeal homework assignments. You are encouraged to work in groups but should turn in your own answers. Your course grade will be based on class participation, homework assignments and a three hour final exam. Readings
Note: We will be likely modifying this list as the course progresses. Items marked with an asterisk are basic reading.
I.
Monopoly
and Price Discrimination * Tirole: Ch1 * Riley: Lecture Note on Non-Linear Pricing Mussa M. and S.
Rosen “Monopoly and Product Quality” JET 18 (1978) 301-317 Maskin Eric S. and Riley “Monopoly with Incomplete
Information” Rand Journal of Economics 15: 171-196 MacAfee Preston, John McMillan and Mike Whinston:
“Multi-product Monopoly, Commodity Bundling and Correlation of Values” Q.J.E.
104 (1989) p. 371-83 Denekere R.. and MacAfee “Damaged Goods,”
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5 (1996) 149-174
II.
Dynamic Price Competition and Collusion *
Tirole: Ch6 * Green E. and Robert Porter “ Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,” Econometrica, 52 (Jan. 1984) pp. 87-100 * Riley "Lecture Note" Rotemberg J. and Garth Saloner, “A
Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms” AER 76 (June 1986) 390-407 *
Porter “A Study of Cartel Stability The Joint Executive Committee,
1880-1886,” Bell Journal of
Economics, 14, (Autumn 1983) pp. 37-57 Ellison Glenn; “Theories of Cartel Stability and
the Joint Executive Committee,” Rand
J., 25, (Spring 1994) pp 37-57 Maskin and Tirole: “A Theory of Dynamic Oligoploy
II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles,” Econometrica 56, (May 1988) pp.571-599
III.
Signalling: Entry, Exit and Limit Pricing * Tirole:
Ch 8 & 9 Dixit Avinash: “The Role of Investment In Entry Deterrence” Economic Journal 90, (March 1980) pp 95-106 Milgrom and Roberts: Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information,” Econometrica (1982) pp 443-460 Riley: “Silver
Signals: Twenty-Five years of Screening and Signaling” JEL 34, (June 2001) pp.
432-478
IV.
Auctions * Vickrey
William: "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal
of Finance, 16, 8-37. * Klemperer, P. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature" Journal of Economic Surveys 13 (1999) pp 228-286 reprinted in ‘The Economic Theory of Auctions” E Elgar (1999) *
Riley: Lecture Notes *
Riley and William F. Samuelson, "Optimal Auctions," American Economic
Review, 71 (June 1981). Myerson, R.B., "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research. 6, (1981) pp 58-73 Milgrom and Robert Weber(1982), "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, 50, 1089-122. *
Milgrom P (1989) "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer" J. of Economic
Perspectives (1989) Bulow J. and D. J. Roberts (1989), "The Simple Economics
of Optimal Auctions," J. Polit. Econ., 97, 1060-90. V. Theory of the Firm * Tirole, Ch. 0, The Theory of the Firm. * Hart, O., 1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press, Ch. 1, 2, 4. Cai, H., 2000, A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership, forthcoming, Rand Journal of Economics. * Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1986, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 691-719. Hart, O., and J. Moore,
1990, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 98:1119-1158. Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom, 1994, The Firm as an Incentive System, American Economic Review, 84:972-991. * Holmstrom, B., and J. Roberts, 1998, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, Journal of Economic Perspective, 12:73-94.
2004 final Exam |
|
