Teaching

Economics 2102: Auctions, Bargaining and Pricing

Week 1 Sept 16th	Why Auctions? Auction Formats Signal Structures and Other Assumptions. IPV Auctions Order Statistics Vickrey's Revenue Equivalence	Krishna
Week 2 Sept 23rd	Lattices, Supermodularity and Monotonicity General Symmetric Model. Correlation, Association and Affiliation. Bidding in the SPA and English Auction. Revenue Comparison.	Topkis Milgrom and Weber (1982)
Week 3 Sept 30th	Bidding in FPA. Linkage Principle. Revelation Principle. Incentive Compatibility.	Milgrom and Weber (1982) Milgrom (1986) MWG
Week 4 Oct 7th	Second degree price discrimination. Marginal Revenue. Optimal Auctions.	MWG Bulow and Roberts (1989)
Week 5 Oct 14th	Optimal Auctions. Revenue Equivalence	Myerson (1981)
Week 6 Oct 21st	Ironing Application: Affirmative Action Full Extraction: Private Values Full Extraction: Common Values	Myerson (1981) Chan and Eyster (2003) Cremer and McLean (1988) McAfee, McMillan and Reny (1992)
Week 7 Oct 28th	Asymmetries: Private Values Asymmetries: Common Values Almost Common Values	Maskin and Riley (2000) Milgrom (1981) Klemperer (1998)
Week 8 Nov 4th	Presentation: Moritz Nash Bargaining Rubinstein Bargaining	Kagel and Levin (1986) Obsorne and Rubinstein
Week 9 Nov 11th	Endogenous Offers N-Person Bargaining Presentation: Mingxiao Bargaining with One--Sided Asymmetric Information	Perry and Reny (1993) Sutton (1986) Coase (1972) Bulow (1982)
Week 10 Nov 18th	Presentation: Stella Presentation: Botao Presentation: Joel	Perry and Reny (1999) Board (2004) Grossman and Hart (1986)
Week 11 Nov 25th	Large Common Value Auctions What information structure is reasonable? Presentation: Hongfei	Milgrom (1981) Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) Kremer (2002)
Week 12 Dec 2nd	Sequential Auctions Coase Conjecture: Finite Periods Coase Conjecture: Infinite Periods Other Equilibria	Milgrom and Weber (1982b) Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985) Sutton (1987) Ausubel and Deneckere (1989)
Week 13 Dec 9th	Signaling Games Bargaining and Signaling Optimal Mechanisms Partnerships	Mailath (1987) Wilson and Kennan (1993) Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) Crampton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987)

A few empirical/experimental papers one could present:

Kagel and Levin. (1986). The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions. American Economic Review.
Hendricks, Porter and Wilson. (1994) Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price. Econometrica.
Beggs and Graddy. (1997). Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions. RAND.
List and Luckling-Reiley. (2000). Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence for a Sportscard Field Experiment. American Economic Review.
Roth and Ockenfels. (2002). Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet. American Economic Review.
Bajari and Hortacsu. (2003). The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions. RAND.
McAfee, Takacs and Vincent. (1999). Tarrifying Auctions. RAND.
Hendricks and Porter. (1988). An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information. American Economic Review.

Index

Date: December 12, 2004